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Abstract
Most software applications rely on the use of user-name and passwords
to authenticate end users. This form of authentication, although used ubiq-
uitously, is widely considered unreliable due to the users inability to keep
them secret; passwords being prone to dictionary or rainbow-table attacks;
as well as the ease with which social engineering techniques can obtain
passwords.
This can be mitigated by combining a variety of different authentica-
tion mechanisms, for example biometric authentication such as fingerprint
recognition or physical tokens such as smart cards. The resulting multi-
factor authentication is typically stronger than any of the techniques used
individually. However, it may still be expensive or prohibited to implement
and more difficult to deploy due to additional accessories cost, e.g, finger
print reader.
Multi-modal biometric systems are those which utilise or are capable
of utilising, more than one physiological or behavioural characteristic for
enrolment, verification, or identification. So, in this research we present a
multi-factor authentication scheme that is based on the user’s own hardware
environment, e.g. laptop with fingerprint reader, thus avoiding the need of
deploying tokens and readily available biometrics, e.g., user keystrokes. The
aim is to improve the reliability of the authentication using a multi-factor
approach without incurring additional cost or making the deployment of
the solution overly complex.
The presented approach in this research uses unique sequential hard-
ware information available from the user’s environment to profile user be-
haviour. This approach improves upon password mechanisms by introduc-
ing a novel Hardware Authentication and User Profiling (HAUP) in form
of Multi-Factor Authentication MFA that can be easily integrated into the
traditional authentication methods. In addition, this approach observes the
advantage of the correlation between user behaviour and hardware envi-
ronment as an implicit verification identity procedure to discriminate user-
name and password usage, in particular hardware environment by specific
pattern. So, the proposed approach uses hardware information to profile
the user’s environment when user-name and password are typed as part of
the log-in process. These Hardware Manufacture Serial Part Numbers (HM-
SPNs) profiles are then correlated with the users behaviour, e.g., key-stroke
behaviour that allows the system to profile user’s behaviour dependent on
their environment. As a result of this approach, the access control system
can determine a particular level of trust for each user and base access control
decisions on it in order to reduce potential identity fraud.
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Chapter 1. Introduction 2
1.1 Background
Computer Security aims to provide Confidentiality, Integrity
and Availability in Information Systems in order to serve the
information technology user. A key component in Information
Systems to ensure Confidentiality and Integrity is Access Con-
trol. Access Control determines if a user is permitted to access
a specific system resource, and how this resource can be used.
A key factor for making access control decisions is to establish
the identity of the user making this request, a process that is
referred to as Authentication.
There are various established mechanisms to authenticate
users, but by far the most widely deployed is the authentication
by username and password. However it is becoming clear that
this particular method is inadequate and prone to various forms
of attack [5]. For example, short passwords can be easily broken
using brute force techniques due to the increased computation
power of today’s personal computers or rented services in the
Cloud. Dependent on the type of password chosen by a user
dictionary attacks or rainbow-table attacks (reviewed in Section
1.2) can be used to assume another user’s identity with relative
ease. Another very effective way of stealing someone’s identity
are social engineering attacks, that trick unsuspecting users
to divulge sufficient personal information about themselves so
that the attacker can assume their identity or simply guess
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information that is required to reset their password information
within the information system.
Authentication can rely on three factors: what a user knows
e.g. “username/password”, what a user has e.g. debit card
and what a user is e.g. fingerprint. Using a combination of
these factors is often referred to as Multi Factor Authentication
(MFA). Most MFA are difficult to deploy due to the cost or
logistic reasons.
This thesis considers a MFA approach that is based on
hardware (HW) and User Profiling paired with well established
username and password mechanisms that overcomes some of
the problems of traditional MFA approaches. The following
sections outline the problem statement and research aims.
1.2 Problem Statement
Identity fraud is estimated to affect 1.8 million UK residents
and having an annual cost the UK economy of 2.7 billion [6].
This type of fraud is mainly utilising authentication vulnera-
bilities in access control mechanism. For example, compromise
the Internet service provider by spoofing using another user’s
authentication keys. The widely used “username/password”
authentication is considered unreliable due to users’ inability
to keep passwords secret; in addition passwords are prone to
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dictionary [7] or rainbow-table attacks [8] as well as the ease
with which social engineering [9] techniques can obtain pass-
words. Moreover, the cost of additional authentication factors
is an obstacle to the deployment of MFA. For example, using
fingerprints in MFA cost £2 GBP for the cheapest fingerprint
reader to be used with users’ computers [10]. One of challenges
faced in MFA involves selecting characteristics of a user’s iden-
tity without additional cost or inconveniencing the user. In
addition, MFA should protect the user identity from spoofing,
and respect user privacy.
Based on this problem statement the following aims and
objectives of this research are established.
1.3 Research Aim and Objectives
The resulting MFA approach should consider cost and impact
on existing environments, whilst providing resistance against
attacks.
To achieve the aim of this research, a HW and user be-
haviour profiling approach is developed for modelling dynamic
user behaviour based on user’s HW environment. This ap-
proach clarifies HW advantages in profiling a user behaviour in
order to reduce potential identity fraud and provide the trust
between the user and service providers. This trust focuses in
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the grater successful log-in attempt using same HW is grate
the level of trust. Theses trust aid the automated verification
of actions against security policies. [11]. The main objectives
to achieve the research aim are:
O.1. Show the feasibility of profiling techniques in MFA.
O.2. Select suitable characteristic for profiling.
O.3. Develop a computational model for authentication
based on the selected characteristics and provides a mathemat-
ical model for profiling that establishes a level of trust in which
authentication is based.
O.4. Develop authentication framework that supports the
mathematical model for profiling the selected characteristics.
O.5. Create authentication prototype based on the selected
characteristics for data collection and evaluation.
O.6. Evaluate the prototype based on the approach against
profiling and authentication approaches.
1.4 Research Questions
The following questions are related to authentication and pro-
filing user behaviour to support “username/password” mecha-
nism. So, this research will discuss the following questions:
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Q.1. How can HW information be used to profile the user?
Chapters 2 and 3 demonstrate that some HW can be used
to observe user activity. This will address objective O.1. by
showing profiling technique in MFA.
Q.2. What HW information is suitable for profiling in the
context of authentication? Chapter 3 demonstrates a profiling
method using unique hardware manufacture serial part num-
bers. This will address objectives O.2. by providing the hard-
ware characteristics to be used in profiling.
Q.3. Can profiling be combined with traditional “username
and password” mechanisms? Chapters 3, 4 and 5 provide the
ability of develop profiling by HW information. This will clarify
the objectives O.1. and O.3. by providing hardware authenti-
cation framework.
Q.4. What characteristics can be collected? Can addi-
tional accessories do this? Chapter 3 and 7 investigate the
use of accessories, such as fingerprint scanner, in combination
with hardware parts to profile usage characteristics. This will
concentrate on the objective O.4. by providing authentication
factors and creating framework based on hardware authentica-
tion for profiling.
Q.5. What is the added cost of a profiling approach? How
can costs to be avoided? Chapter 3 illustrates the developed
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profiling cost compared with the cost of current profiling tech-
nologies. This will focus on the objective O.5. by implementing
MFA approach and demonstrates the cost of the authentication
factors.
Q.6. How much profile information needs to be available to
improve authentication? Chapters 4 and 6 determine when a
profile is reliable. This will address objective O.5 by analysing
the authentication prototype and factors in authentication.
Q.7. What is the impact of multiple users using various
devices? This is discussed in Chapter 7. This will address
objective O.6. by providing on evaluation for this approach.
1.5 Scope of the Research
This work addresses identity fraud in traditional authentication
approach that is username and password. In this research we
look how servers authenticate the clients. Profiling user pat-
terns has many techniques to recognize user activity. For ex-
ample, using cookies by means of collecting information about
their behaviour during authentication, whilst taking their HW
context into account.
Other traditional MFA factors such as fingerprint or phys-
ical tokens such as smart cards are not considered because of
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the cost of deploying these devices. In this research we focus
on available user hardware to investigate profiling user charac-
teristics.
1.6 Research Methodology
As in majority of computer science approaches the described
research belongs to the constructive research field where the
constructive refer to knowledge contribution being developed
as new framework [12]. So, this research uses a constructive
approach to analyse and explore problem then provide solution
and develop new approach to solve it. [13]. Four main steps
constitute the methodology proposed.
Step 1: Critical Literature Review
Background research is conducted with critical review using
hard and digital resources. For example, using Google scholar
search for E-books and focusing in latest related published pa-
pers. In addition, using libraries and focus on specific and
related journal, conferences and symposium in order to ex-
pand knowledge in research scope. For example, Association
for Computing Machinery (ACM), Springer and IEEE Secu-
rity and Privacy Magazine. This step enhanced understanding
of main factors and approaches in authentication including HW
profiling to provide evidence for the research objectives O.1.,
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O.2. and related to research questions Q.1., Q.2., Q.3. and
Q.4.
Step 2: Hardware System Methodology
Focuses on designing a system architecture using UML [14]
to capture the research objectives O.3. and O.4. and answer re-
search questions Q.5. and Q.6. provides a formal specification
of the authentication approach using a mathematical model to
support the approach.
Step 3: Implementation
This step aims to implement HW Authentication and User
Profiling (HAUP) prototype to be integrated into a MFA frame-
work. This HW prototype is implemented by Java code which
has virtual machine specification and has access to hardware
information in order to illustrate the approach in this research.
This step clarifies the profiling influence in authentication deci-
sions and finds a mechanism to observe profile influence based
on a trust-model. Finally, this step implements the system pro-
totype and components in order to achieve the objectives O.5.
and O.6. of this research and is related to research question
Q.5.
Step 4: Set of Experiments and Evaluation
In this step the research will implement the system proto-
type to collect information from the set of experiments. This
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information is about user behaviour in typing “username/pass-
word” using a variety of hardware. This step will analyse this
information which comes as result of the set of experiments
in HAUP approach. In this step the research determines the
main criteria by comparing between the result of HW profiling
approach and neural network analysis results that related to
research question Q.6 and Q.7.
1.7 Contributions
This research develops an authentication approach to help to
protect the user from identity fraud. The key contribution
of this research is using HW information together with user
behaviour in profiling a user to improve “username/password”
based on authentication mechanism in MFA.
This research builds a framework to profile a MFA model
to analyse user HW environments and behaviours in order to
profile a user. The contribution is a novel authentication tech-
nique that analyses HW information and user behaviour. This
approach develops the modelling of dynamic behaviour of the
user to support profiling and then establishing trust in the user.
The technical contributions of this research are:
C.1. Chapter 3 provides the built framework for Multi-
factor authentication based on hardware and user behaviour.
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That addressed object O.4. by providing the framework to
demonstrate HW authentication methods. This contribution
addresses questions Q.1., Q.2. and Q.4. by giving the method
and requirements of building authentication method in this re-
search.
C.2. Chapter 4 integrates the new authentication mecha-
nism traditional “username/password” mechanism. That clar-
ifies objective O.3. by providing the methodology of using HW
information in authentication. This contribution in Chapter 4
answers question Q.3.
C.3. Chapter 5 provides a mathematical model for trust
that combines profiling information addressing objective O.3.
and answering question Q.5.
C.4. Chapter 7 demonstrates the feasibility of the approach
by implementing a set of experiments to address objective O.6.
and answer questions Q.6. and Q.7 by showing the advantages
and impact of the HW authentication approach.
1.8 Success Criteria
The thesis success criteria are as follows:
S.C.1. Critical literature review of access control.
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S.C.2. Framework for access control using Hardware Au-
thentication and User Profiling.
S.C.3. Evaluation of the development of proposed frame-
work using various scenarios.
1.9 Thesis Structure
The thesis is organised as follows:
The second chapter reviews authentication techniques
and issues to provide the related work of profiling user be-
haviour techniques in authentication approaches. Section 2.1
analyses current authentication techniques and clarifies the lim-
itations in authentication factors in order to contrast this re-
search against related work. Section 2.2 provides background
about authentication and analysing profiling user approaches
to illustrate the influence of profiling requirements in cost and
user convenience. Section 2.3 provides an overview of HW Man-
ufacture Serial Part Numbers (HMSPNs) characteristics and
their utilisation in profiling techniques that is determined to
profile user behaviour in the developed approach. After that,
section 2.4 illustrates and reviews current authentication tech-
niques which are depending on HW information to profile a user
to compare between the developed and current HW authen-
tication. Finally, this chapter highlights the neural network
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analysis to evaluate user behaviour when HW authentication is
used. Section 2.5 provides the related work of neural network
utilisation to profile the user.
Chapter three describes the methodology of this work
to identify computer HW modeling as an authentication factor
(Ownership factor) in MFA. This methodology is based on par-
ticular modeling and developing a framework solution to build
a trust model. Section 3.1 illustrates the key method of Hard-
ware Authentication and User Profiling HAUP approach to de-
velop “username/password” mechanism. This method is using
HW information which are considered as fixed unique numbers
and difficult to temper with as a one of the platform-unique in-
formation and has been used as a platform identifier for several
public services [15]. Section 3.2 demonstrates HAUP technique
to observe HW information and user behaviour during the HW
life cycle in order to use HW information in profiling a user.
Section 3.3 explains how to profile the user with respect to
analyse HW characteristics. Section 3.4 illustrates the general
HAUP framework. Section 3.5 provides HAUP components to
clarify the method to capture user HW and behaviour. Then,
section 3.6 analyses HAUP procedures to check user behaviour
based on particular HW. Next, section 3.7 presents HW MFA
technique to analyse users patterns in particular HW properties
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that establish HAUP authentication key for the user. Finally,
this chapter determines the general requirements to implement
HAUP prototype in section 3.8.
Chapter four proposes HAUP system architecture and
framework. This chapter discusses HAUP system procedures
to analyse user patterns with respect to HW information. Sec-
tion 4.1 explains the HAUP system framework to recognize HW
authentication procedures and implement HW authentication
system. Section 4.2 clarifies HAUP system architecture map
and determines the procedures between HAUP system compo-
nents. After that, section 4.3 provides HAUP system proce-
dures to read user’s HW and observe user’s behaviour using
traditional “username/password” authentication following by
explains how to profile a user to determine a level of trust.
Chapter five addresses the mathematical model of HAUP
approach with respect to the motivation of using HAUP sys-
tem method. This chapter provides mathematical procedure
to profile the user using HAUP authentication factors. Sec-
tion 5.1 clarifies HW information in mathematical expression
by computing HW weight to trust the user and provides formal
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assumptions and analysis for hardware profiling in HAUP ap-
proach. Section 5.2 provides illustrative examples using hard-
ware information factors in HAUP mathematical model based
on given weight of trust for HAUP factors. Then, section 5.3
provides mathematical equations to present user HW influence
and profiling user behaviour in a mathematical model. Sec-
tion 5.3.1 provides a mathematical model using back propaga-
tion algorithm to analyse user behaviour.
Chapter six provides the modeling of the software to im-
plement HAUP system components. This MFA prototype is
based on describes the implementation of profiling HW infor-
mation and user behaviour as followed in software engineer-
ing systems. This chapter implements the HAUP prototype
for gathering information to be analysed and then evaluate
HW authentication approach in chapter 7. Section 6.1 pro-
vides a technical scenario for HW authentication profiling to
explain analysis procedure when log-in procedure “username/-
password” in progress. Section 6.2 presents procedures that are
used to compare between user behaviour and patterns. This
comparison assists to profile and trust a user when a user be-
haviour has similarity with his/her pattern in using same HW.
Section 6.3 provides techniques to compute level of trust for
a user followed by addressing implementation steps to analyse
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user HW and behaviour. Finally, section 6.4 defines the system
interaction of the deployed software.
Chapter seven analyses and evaluates the HAUP proto-
type results to explore the advantage of using HW information
in profile the user in MFA. This chapter determines evaluation
criteria in section 7.1. This evaluation criteria compare between
current profiling user behaviour in authentication approaches
and using HW information as profiling factor. Section 7.2 pro-
vides data analysis for user behaviour in typing “username and
password” keys. Section 7.3 presents set of experiments using
two different HW to illustrate user behaviour analysis result in
every particular HW. Section 7.4 illustrates log-in time to sup-
port analysing users HW by to explore the difference in user’s
behaviour recognition when the user moves between more than
one piece of HW. Section 7.5 the ability of using priority class
base on profiling HW information to illustrate trust improve-
ment based on HAUP approach factors. Finally, the chapter
ends with using neural network for the analysis of user be-
haviour when a variety of hardware are used to evaluate the
result of HW approach in section 7.6.
Chapter eight provides a conclusion for this research and
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discusses the success criteria with respect to the obtained re-
sults. Then, this chapter discuss potential improvement that
would enhance the proposed approach as part of future work.
Section 8.1 clarifies the research achievements to determine
the advantages of HAUP. Section 8.2 presents the contribution
to knowledge. Section 8.3 revisits the success criteria of this
work to compare between HAUP and contemporary MFA ap-
proaches. Section 8.4 addresses the limitation and weakness of
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This chapter provides background information on current
authentication approaches and analyses authentication factors.
It also reviews the related work in the current authentication
approach and focuses on the limitations and difficulties expe-
rienced which affected the decision as to whether to develop
a new authentication approach. In this chapter, Multi-Factor
Authentication (MFA) approaches and mechanisms that im-
prove profiling in access control are reviewed by exploring the
limitations and difficulties of developing a profiling approach.
This chapter demonstrates Neural Network usage and analy-
sis in profiling systems and provides the background to neural
networks utilisation in computer security and profiling systems.
Section 2.1 analyses authentication factors in access control
and provides the limitations and difficulties of deploying these
factors. Section 2.2 addresses the relationship between cur-
rent authentication approaches and profiling techniques that
strengthen authentication and improve the level of trust [16].
Section 2.3 provides an overview of computer HW which con-
tains significant information in respect of profiling users. Then,
section 2.4 illustrates profiling approaches and describes the
different mechanism used for profiling users, depending on the
content of the HW information. Finally, section 2.5 analyses
the neural network methods which are used to recognize user
behaviour.
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2.1 Authentication in Access Control
Security systems which are installed in computers, switches,
routers, firewall devices and security services are all providing
protection to Information Technology (IT ) services. To pro-
tect IT services from any misuse, illegal authority and cyber
threats, there are many built in and pre-programmed security
procedures both in computers and computer networks which
are in place specifically. Some of these procedures aim to sup-
port user privacy issues and some are there to protect the IT
services from malicious misuse. Figure 2.1 illustrates an exam-
ple of the security services and mechanism in place to protect
computer services and focuses on authentication approaches in
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Figure 2.1: Network Layers and Security Service [1]
Access control is the prevention of unauthorised use of a
resource, including the prevention of use of a resource in an
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unauthorised manner [18]. Granting a user authentication in
computer applications provides assurance of the stated identity
of an entity [19]. This authentication procedure has a crucial
process in access control. However, user identity compromised
is the main concern in any authentication procedure. In the ac-
cess control application, at the application layer that is shown
in Figure 2.1 there are three main authentication security iden-
tification factors that need to be determined before a level of
trust can be applied to the user [20].
These factors are:
A. Something the user knows, e.g., username and password.
B. Something the user has, e.g., debit card.
C. Something the user is or does, e.g., fingerprint.
The “username and password” are an essential and tra-
ditional identification technique and a popular authentication
approach that is based on knowledge factors [21]. Strong pass-
word must consist of letters (i.e. capital letters and lowercase),
symbols and numbers. Using additional factors such as a credit
card number as an ownership factor is required to profile and
authenticate the user as part of the MFA approach. In MFA
approaches, the user has to identify at least two of the three
identities to verify and profile a user. MFA authentication is
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a more valuable authentication identity. However, the cost of
additional authentication in MFA is a difficult to meet [22].
Physiological and behavioural biometrics are the main bio-
metrics authentication factors [23]. These authentication fac-
tors are considered as inherence factors [24]. Physiological bio-
metrics authentication identifies physiological user characteris-
tics which are unique inherence information. For example, fin-
gerprints and eye retina/iris scanning. In contrast, behavioural
biometrics is the process of detecting the behavioural features
of the user [25]. For example, digital signature and keystroke
dynamics.
2.1.1 The Limitations in Authentication Factors and
Approaches
Having a record of a user’s personal and key information is
the authentication factor’s knowledge identity. Using knowl-
edge factors alone is considered as Single Factor Authentication
[26] and one of the traditional authentication approaches [9].
Knowledge factor keys are not enough to authenticate the user
because they are prone to dictionary or rainbow-table attacks
as well as the ease with which social engineering techniques
can obtain passwords. Association ownership factors coupled
with knowledge factors can increase the probability of reducing
any potential identity fraud. This association is one example
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of MFA approaches [27]. Visual identity processes can also
be used to verify user authentication, however, this, and other
MFA approaches require additional costs to produce.
2.1.2 Single Factor Authentication
The most common Electronic Identification (eID) models are
widely available on the market and there are a number of rea-
sons as to why this particular ownership authentication model
was chosen as the preferred authentication method. Initially, it
was widely assumed that there would be much competition be-
tween providers which drove production costs down and there-
fore made this the most common and available model [28]. As
a result, eIDs are regarded as an extremely important driver in
respect of e-service development and currently are very widely
used in the world of IT solutions. The eID server may be oper-
ated by the service provider or a third party. Some eIDs provide
an authentication certificate as a warranty to verify it as the
ownership factor supplied to the organisation or individual who
rely on the service.
On the client side, a card reader, client software package
and other additional accessories, e.g. fingerprint reader, are re-
quired to provide user profiling [29]. Basic card readers leave
the responsibility of recording and monitoring user interaction
to the software and do not record any visual or behavioural
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evidence for this interaction. Advanced card readers, however,
have their own PIN entry keypad to protect against malware
attacks. The client software allows the protected communica-
tion between the card and the eID server, displays authorisa-
tion certificates and allows the user to restrict access to eID
data fields. In addition, the chip on the ID card verifies the
user’s PIN and the authorisation certificate of the eID server
and release of the information are authorised[30]. So, using eID
relies on securing the identity and this may require additional
profiling, especially in the online authentication process.
Another authentication identity project in recent ownership
factor authentication approaches is Super Identity (SID) [31].
This SID depends on a comprehensive identification method in
order to improve the trust in user’s identity. SID project inves-
tigates the relations between offline and online identities, the
cross-disciplinary association ranges from biometric measures
through to management of on-line identities [32]. This ap-
proach defines the set of identity measures of interest and gath-
ers relevant datasets either from existing resources or through
active data collection from participants across diverse demo-
graphic populations[33]. These measures of interest fail into
two categories:
a) static and behavioural measure in real world; and
b) static and behavioural measure in cyber world.
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SID provides a step-change in the current thinking and
ideas regarding the processes which are more effective in iden-
tity and identification monitoring, and places much value on
the impact that this has in the real world. This approach aims
to implement comprehensive authentication to trust the user
by using behavioural measures.
Naji et.al. [34] enhanced authentication security in access
control systems by using handwritten signatures as behavioural
biometrics to strengthen and protect authentication keys from
identity fraud. Their system employs the static and dynamic
features of the signature to make a decision about the identity
of the signature through a combination of matching statistical
models to analyse them [35]. As result, handwritten signature
processing and extracting their features is time consuming and
requires dedicated HW environment at the user side. Chap-
ter 3 in this research provides authentication approach based
on username and password authentication technique and hand-
written by recognizing user keystroke and explains the method
of employing dynamic features in username and password au-
thentication technique.
2.1.3 Multi-Factor Authentication
In MFA, a combination of methods from at least two of the
basic authentication factors is used to get the authorisation;
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for example, a bank card and Personal Identification Number
(PIN). In some approaches, users are required to provide a
password number from a security token [36].
One of the motivations of using MFA is to improve the sin-
gle factor based Authenticated Key Exchange (AKE) by com-
bining two or even more factors in one system [37]. These MFA
approaches are based on a single factor and in recent times,
MFA has come forward as an active research topic [38]. How-
ever, extra caution should be taken as current approaches to
MFA are expensive and difficult to deploy [39].
Integrating the credit card payment system with biometrics
in MFA has given support for more efficient verification. This
method proposes to employ fingerprint verification with a credit
card in a MFA [40]. Doing this would need the installation of
additional equipment that would increase the cost.
Employing biometrics when using a credit card in authenti-
cation as a MFA procedure is another access control approach
[41]. This system approaches time that affects the user ac-
ceptability for the system and using fingerprint authentication
comes at low to medium cost with a medium level of accuracy.
The card reader is an additional level of HW security that
can use a One Time Password OTP [42]. The chip on the client
user card generates the OTP, with the caveat that the account
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is rendered inaccessible if the card is lost or stolen. This ad-
ditional challenge-response mechanism is run over a separate
channel and removes the need for security questions to confirm
transactions and also helps to prevent fraud. To embed the
OTP in an SMS by using a mobile phone as the token reader
requires accessories in the user’s computer and depends on ad-
ditional secure channels [43] as these will also come with addi-
tional costs [44]. With the ubiquity of mobile phones, sending
an SMS text or voice messages that includes an OTP is, in ef-
fect, extending the card reader approach [45]. Here, the mobile
phone is considered a secure channel, albeit with the increas-
ing connectivity of smart phones this cannot be considered as
independent as the original card reader [46, 47]. Whilst this
approach reduces the cost in deploying readers, it adds addi-
tional costs on the extra communication channels and requires
these channels to be accessible to the user [48].
Pennam K. [49] improved new models of accessories by us-
ing particular chips and models of improved new models of ac-
cessories by using particular chips and models of Liquid Crystal
Display (LCD) as a method to obtain a reliable authentication
factors. This approach is collaborated with the Global System
for Mobile (GSM ) messages which is implemented to decipher
the fingerprint in the OTP verification LCD as a method to
obtain a reliable authentication factors. This approach is col-
laborated with the GSM messages which is implemented to
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decipher the fingerprint in the OTP verification [50, 51]. How-
ever, this technique needs to notify the Automated Teller Ma-
chine (ATM ) and requires additional secure information from
the user to deliver the OTP.
In the overall analysis of multi and single factor authen-
tication approaches, authentication factors and features can
be classified into four categories which are static or dynamic
and physical or knowledge-based biometrics. On the one hand,
physical biometrics is associated with the inherited physiologi-
cal characteristics of the human body which is ’something the
user is’. This technique employs the characteristics of finger-
prints, palm prints or faces which are considered static phys-
ical biometrics. On the other hand, behavioural biometrics
occur from activities carried out by the user either sponta-
neously or specifically learned. Dynamic or behavioural bio-
metric techniques include handwritten signatures, keystroke
dynamics, gait patterns and lip movement. Techniques that use
passwords or PINs’ are dynamic knowledge-based biometrics,
whereas ’something the user has’ techniques that utilise mag-
netic cards and smart cards are considered static and physical-
based biometrics [52]. Figure 2.2 factors and features in current
authentication illustrate the techniques.
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Figure 2.2: Authentication Techniques [2]
Identity frauds are still one of the major concerns for the
IT service provider because the client may actually be an at-
tacker attempting to compromise the privilege and the server
or service provider cannot assume otherwise [53]. Improving
authentication factors and techniques should have a compre-
hensive recognizing method to identify the profile before or at
the same time of obtaining the authority [54].
Using MFA is improving the authentication processes by
profiling the user. However, this improvement requires addi-
tional costs and may cause an inconvenience to the user. This
work provides the MFA approach based on the resources that
are available to profile the user paying particular attention to
reducing the cost and without causing any user inconvenience.
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Chapter 4 in this research declares authentication approach
based on avoiding user inconvenience.
2.2 User Profiling
In order to profile a user a set of personal data relating to the
specific user must be collected. In information technology (IT),
this data refers to a person’s identity by providing digital illus-
tration. During the process of profiling the user the description
of the characteristics of a person will be stored. A profile will
comprise of a set of parameters because the variation on just
one single parameter may be not be enough in itself to signal
an alert. Exploiting this information by taking into account
the person’s characteristics and preferences can also support
the identity. For example, using adaptive hypermedia systems
that personalise the individual computer communication can
profile the user. A computer demonstration of a user model
can measure the user profile. User profiles can be found on
operating systems, computer programs, or dynamic websites
[55]. As a result, the authentication process is the procedure
followed to profile a user by evaluating the data generated by
their methods and patterns of behaviour.
Using Credit Card Verification 2 (CCV2 ) to dodge gener-
ating valid card numbers is another method used in physical
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profiling predominantly to protect users when ordering goods
and services over the internet. This technique supplies a card
number by providing evidence that the user is in physical pos-
session of the card which profiles the usage in order to trust
him or her and this approach has been used since 1998. How-
ever, the payment card may be stolen or spoofed in which case
it makes it virtually impossible to detect fraudulent usage [56].
Applying the Long Credit Card Verification 2 (LCCV2 )
to implement random CCV2 in a credit card is an improved
method of saving the security keys. This approach depends
on the user to secure the random CCV2 keys that requires the
user to keep additional password keys [57].These security pro-
cedures are profiling the user activity and improve the level of
trust using additional secret keys. These additional keys also
rely on the user’s memory and ability to remember more ad-
ditional password keys. This level of trust cannot differ from
the real user and any another user who compromises user iden-
tity. Moreover, this level of information is required additional
cost, e.g., credit cards and user memory. So, further profiling
is required to recognize user behaviour.
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2.2.1 Profiling Services
Profiling information can be exploited by a system taking into
account the person’s characteristics and preference. For ex-
ample, using adaptive hypermedia systems to learn user be-
haviour that personalise the individual user’s pattern can pro-
file the user. Some of the relationships between identities and
users, identities and service profiles and identities and devices
which published standard profiling services are not yet fully
understood and, without doubt, have not yet been verified in
user identification services. Moreover, these standards have
been fixed by requirements from particular communication do-
mains. Applying these techniques to new multimedia applica-
tions, Next Generation Networking (NGN ) terminals and to
Web-based services will produce interesting services and yet
unimagined effects [58].
R. Copeland [59] stated that the area of user identities and
service profiles is beginning to be extended to support internet
protocol (IP), multi-media sub-system (IMS ) and Web inte-
gration. Web-based authentication and Single Sign On (SSO)
can already be integrated with IMS; group management stan-
dards allow re-using groups across many applications and user
profiles can accommodate data from social network websites.
So, user profiling techniques for authentication should provide
support for a secure information technology environment.
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2.2.2 Detecting User Behaviour
Detecting user behaviour and activity, e.g., user’s typing speed
in the keyboard and which device the user normally uses is one
of the profiling methods used to trust the user. This detecting
is observed by analysing the user behaviour records that can
explore user patterns. These records provide support to the
unauthorised detection function as Intrusion Detection System
(IDS ) in two behaviours [60]. Firstly, the IDS approach must
make a decision on a number of metrics that can be used to
determine user behaviour. Analysis of review records over a
period of time can be used to determine the activity profile of
the average user. Thus, the review records are supplied by the
definition of typical behaviour. Secondly, the current review
records are the input methods used to detect intrusion. That
is the intrusion detection analysis incoming review records to
determine variation from average behaviour.
Using mouse biometric behaviour to verify the user by ob-
serving movement is extracting angel-based metrics to profile
the user. However, this approach requires additional proce-
dures from the user which is using the mouse as an authenti-
cation factor in order to verify the authority. Current authen-
tication techniques are used to support the usability for the
user instead of additional verification techniques [61]. One of
main drawback in behaviour detection is producing many false
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alarms because the user’s pattern and system activity can vary
too widely to be recognized. Additional drawback is the diffi-
culty of establishing a normal definition for acceptable activity
[62].
Profiling based anomaly detection system requires profil-
ing user characteristics. In authentication approaches, profiling
user characteristics should be aware of authentication factors
availability. Profiling user characteristics needs additional cost
to be implemented in both the server and client sides.
There are two types of Statistical Anomaly Detection tech-
niques [63]: First: Threshold Detection System which involves
counting the number of incidents of specific event type over an
interval of time. If the count surpasses what is considered to
be a sensible number that one misuse might be expected to oc-
cur. Second: Profile Based Anomaly Detection System which
relates to user profile focuses on characteristics of the past be-
haviour of a user or related groups of users and then detecting
significant deviation.
Profiling the user in authentication can use any free or avail-
able data resources to improve the trust. For example, profiling
a user using cookies requires lower cost than using fingerprint
scanner profiling. This research discusses detecting user be-
haviour using Profile Based Anomaly Detection System based
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on hardware information which can be considered a free re-
source to profile the user.
2.2.3 Cookies in Profiling Users
Cookies can enclose unique identification data for the user to
recognize and remembers users as profiling servers. There are
many genuine uses in cookies, such as storing users’ preferences
and items in online shopping carts. Cookies allow websites to
track the activities of users within the site in order to improve
the site or to suggest products based on users’ browsing histo-
ries [64].
Cookies are site-specific; however they can still be used
to track user’s behaviour across multiple sites. A website can
allow a third party to place a cookie on a user’s hard drive in
order to authenticate the user. For example, adding network
double click might place a cookie on a user’s computer when
the user visits a website that displays ads supplied by double
click [65].
Browser’s controls have a standard to allow the user to
delete inapplicable cookies [66]. However, at least two per-
mutations the flash cookie evade simple deletion. For example,
Adobe’s of Flash software allows websites to store up to twenty-
five times the amount of information of a regular cookie [67].
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This permits large sound and video files to preload enough in-
formation to ensure smooth playback. The software can also
store data from cookies, recreating cookies with the same unique
identification number even after a user deletes the originals .
The basic function of a cookie is to allow web servers to
store and retrieve information on the user’s machine. Although,
there is no major security consideration in using these cookies
however there are privacy and usability issues which affect their
deployment [68]. So, using cookies’ information depends on
temporary keys that are stored in users’ devices. Cookies keys
cannot be fixed identification for user environments to profile
the user because of the user ability to delete cookies information
from the computer device and therefore, cannot determine user
context in using a particular device
2.2.4 Keystroke and Profiling Users
Recognizing user keystroke behaviour is one of the biometric
behaviour recognition processes [69]. This recognition is based
on the hypothesis of different people as they type in unique and
different typing measures [70]. There are many basic meth-
ods [71, 72] which are used to analyse keystrokes and thus,
keystroke dynamics can be used as behavioural biometrics for
users. This is the technique used for analysing users’ typing be-
haviour and where keyboard input is monitored [73, 74]. This
Chapter 2. Literature Review 37
technique is good to visualise the significant pattern differences
between the different user’s keystroke behaviour and infers that
analysing the keystroke dynamics is a very encouraging method
to identify a user [75, 76].
False Accept Rate (FAR) or false match rate is the proba-
bility that the system miss-matches the input pattern to non-
matching criteria. It measures the presence of invalid inputs
which are incorrectly accepted as being valid. In the case of
the similarity scale, if the person is compromised in reality,
i.e., if the matching score is higher than the threshold, then
the user is treated as genuine and that increases the FAR and
accordingly, performance also depends upon the selection of
the threshold value [77]. In contrast, False Reject Rate (FRR)
or false non-match rate is the probability that the system fails
to detect a match between the input pattern and a matching
template in the database. It measures the percentage of valid
inputs which are incorrectly rejected [78, 79].
Profiling keystroke behaviour approaches is mostly char-
acterised by the error rates in these following precision cases
based on FAR, FRR [80]. For example, FAR is applied when
user keystroke behaviour is not combined with user keystroke
key patterns. So, it is insufficient to be an objective authenti-
cation factor. This implies that keystroke dynamics is a very
encouraging method to identify user using FRR [81, 82, 76].
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Chapter 7 of this research authentication approach is im-
proving the FAR discrimination of user behaviour by further
clarifying user patterns using the user’s context when the be-
haviour is recognized and pattern is captured.
Statistical [70] and neural network [83] techniques are the
main two keystroke approaches and there are some combina-
tions of both approaches [84, 71]. Statistical approaches com-
pare a reference set of typing characteristics of a specific user
with a test set of typing characteristics of the same user. Neu-
ral Networks use historical data that comes from the previous
usage, and then uses this data model to predict the result of a
new test or to classify a new observation [85, 86, 87].
To reduce the HW environment factor that may affect user
behaviour in keystroke, Maxion and Killourhy [88] explored a
number pad input using a single finger. They tried to discrimi-
nate the users’ typing style using FAR and FRR scope and sug-
gest a low level of security that authentication using keystroke
biometrics can be used in particular environment [89, 90].
Keystroke dynamics alone is insufficient to be an objec-
tive authentication factor as some drawbacks have been ex-
posed by other research [91] which re-valued that inhibited
keystrokes can come from the real word applications. This
inhibited keystroke came about because of the user’s environ-
ment which were influenced when the keystrokes were provided.
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One research experiment explored the possibility of using mod-
ified keyboards that were based on pressure sensors to recog-
nize users keystroke [92]. This pressure sensor keyboard has
the ability to capture the password sequence when a key is
pressed down, however, this feature is not available in an ordi-
nary keyboard and would therefore come with additional costs,
e.g., surface touch keyboard.
Incident response is addressing and managing the after-
math of a security breach, gaining authority or attack. This
response is understood only based on the exploits used after an
incident occurs [93]. So, the only data that has been gathered
is what is left on the compromised system. Unfortunately, this
information has delayed, limited and tells us little about the
overall threat for example in ”cyber crime” scenario to obtain
illegal authorisation the most important weak point is hack-
ers are not at the crime location to be profiled in early stage
using any available information resources. Profiling the user
remotely requires variety of method to be compatible with user
devices to trust the user reliably for example if a user uses
just traditional authentication ”username and password” the
access control system should have additional biometric recog-
nizing technique to authenticate the user. One of the challenges
faced in authentication involves alternative profiling specifically
in traditional authentication ”username and password”. HW
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authentication can support the incident response by giving HW
information as crime tools in cyper crime at early stage.
Recognizing user behaviour can support and improve pro-
filing techniques. Keystroke profiling techniques are related to
providing authentication keys and can be observed by moni-
toring user behaviour. However, profiling keystrokes requires
additional factors to recognize user activity and decipher user
behaviour. Some of these factors may cause an inconvenience
for the user, however, this research will discuss alternative pro-
filing factors which can be used to recognize user keystrokes and
profile the user at a low cost and with little or no inconvenience
to the user. Chapter 4 discusses the method in further detail
and provides examples of additional methods used to recognize
users’ keystroke behaviour.
2.3 Hardware Information Overview
Hardware (HW ) is any physical computer part, e.g., mouse,
screen or case, as physical systems have physical outputs. Each
computer device is created as a set of HW parts, for example,
the motherboard and media storage. Some of these parts are
mandatory parts and others could be accessories. These parts
are fixed and are not easy to tamper with.
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Manufacturers of computer parts have to register their parts
under the manufacturer name with a unique serial number.
These numbers are considered as fixed HW information and
could be made by one manufacturer or more in the same com-
puter. In authentication systems these parts can play a signifi-
cant factor to determine user privileges to gain authentications.
Network card numbers or “MAC address”, hard disc drives
(HDDs) and motherboards are all examples of HW parts.
2.3.1 MAC address
The MAC address is a 6-byte, 12- digit hexadecimal number
which is divided into two parts. The manufacturers identifier is
the first half of this address. A manufacturer is assigned a range
of MAC addresses to use when HW part numbers are serialized.
The second half of the MAC address is a serial number the man-
ufacturer has assigned to the device. The MAC is considered to
be a unique identifier attached to network adapters called Net-
work Interface Cards (NIC ). It is a number that serves as an
identifier for a particular network adapter. Network cards (or
built-in network adapters) in any two different computers will
have different MAC addresses, as would an Ethernet adapter
and a wireless adapter in the same computer. However, it is
possible to change the MAC address in the computer device,
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often referred to as MAC spoofing or cloning which is an il-
legal hacker’s tool used to obtain unauthorised privilege [94].
Table 2.1 illustrates some common MAC address examples.









Table 2.1: Common Network Cards “MAC address” Companies and
their HW Part Numbers
The MAC data communication protocol sub-layer is a sub-
layer of the Data Link Layer (DLL) specified in the seven-layer
OSI model (layer 2). It provides addressing and channel access
control mechanisms that make it possible for several terminals
or network nodes to communicate within a multi-point network,
typically a local area network (LAN ) or metropolitan area net-
work (MAN). The HW that implements the MAC is referred
to as a MAC. The MAC sub-layer acts as an interface between
the Logical Link Control (LLC ) sub-layer and the network’s
physical layer. The MAC layer emulates a full-duplex logical
communication channel in a multi-point network [95].
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Using the MAC address alone is not reliable enough to iden-
tify the user because the user has the ability to change this
hardware information that is HMSPNs. However, by using
additional hardware information, this can reduce the spoof-
ing potential. In this research project, the information from
three separate hardware parts were used to provide the au-
thentication prototype and this is discussed in chapter 7. In
addition, the work discussed in chapter 8 clarifies the ability
to implement a comprehensive approach that recognizes all the
hardware parts used.
2.3.2 Storage Media Numbers
Storage media drivers are storage devices that store digitally
encoded data. Early hard drives have removable media; how-
ever, the hard drives which are predominantly used today are
typically sealed units.
There are at least 200 international companies that man-
ufacture media storage units. Many of these companies have
also now started to support new, smaller form factors that are
compatible with the ever-reducing physical sizes of modern day
computing and IT devices. These HW parts have unique and
fixed manufactured serial part numbers. Table 2.2 illustrates
some storage media manufacturer serial part numbers [3, 96].
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Table 2.2: “Media Storage” Companies and their HW Parts Numbers
[3]
2.3.3 Motherboard Serial Numbers
The motherboard manufacturer serial number is another ex-
ample of hardware information. This is known as the Basic
Input and Output System (BIOS ) serial number. This num-
ber could be shown on screen during the memory count when
the computer is turned on. Table 2.3 illustrates some BIOS
numbers.
BIOS manufacturers numbers Manufacturer
2A5LAH09C Award BIOS
51-0505-001437-00111111 AMI BIOS
Table 2.3: Some “BIOS” Manufacturers and their HW Part Numbers[4]
HW information has some characteristics of the user envi-
ronment when the user has entered authentication keys to use
or log on to the IT services. These HW part numbers contain
significant information about the computer. For example, one
or a number of specific HW parts are used when a particular
action or series of actions are carried out by the user. As such,
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the HW context information is profiling the user’s behaviour
when the IT services are used.
2.4 Using HW Information in Authentica-
tion
HW has been used to facilitate authentication for a long time.
The idea is that owners/users register their devices based on
their MAC address so that, the devices themselves are authen-
ticated, rather than their users. MAC addresses are used in the
cryptography of files, authentication and integrity networks to
support the security of data transportation. This technique
uses the MAC address as a key authentication factor to secure
the communication session with the Internet Protocol (IP) ad-
dress to reach the device destination [97].
Filtering MAC addresses to secure the wireless network is
essential in giving users access to the wireless network. Doing
so will give precise control to wireless users connected with the
Access Point (AP) associated with their MAC address [98]. If
this filtering is not applied and the MAC address of the client is
not given, the client will not be granted access to the wireless
network. So, MAC addresses of the client computer device
gives the authorisation needed for a wireless connection which
is between the client and server [99].
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Spoofing attack is a situation in which one person or pro-
gram successfully masquerades as another user by falsifying
data and thereby gaining an illegitimate advantage [100]. Spoof-
ing of MAC is usually beyond the average wireless user’s expe-
rience. In order to carry out spoofing on a MAC address, the
client needs to be associated with a particular AP. As result,
using the MAC address in wireless security depends on filtering
the MAC address of the client without determining the user’s
characteristics.
Another method of HW authentication usage is storage me-
dia drivers such as HDDs . Each storage media item has a
unique HMSPN as an identifier product code that can be used
in profiling [101]. These HMSPNs are already actively used
for identification, albeit that they can be modified at firmware
level and thus are susceptible to spoofing. For example, Mi-
crosoft products send product and HW identifiers during the
activation process [102, 103]. So, this HW information provides
the opportunity to profile the user’s computing environment.
Port security is a mechanism which is used to restrict the
MAC addresses that connect via a particular port switch. This
tool allows defined and specific access to a particular port to
allow a unique MAC addresses, or a range of MAC addresses.
To connect to the LAN port, it will allow access of MAC ad-
dresses which belong to a range according to a configured list.
When a frame arrives to the switch it will compare the MAC
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addresses with the MAC addresses on the configured allowed
list. If the MAC address matches one of items on the list then
the packet is allowed to go through. In contrast, if the MAC
address does not belong to the configured list the port will drop
the packet. So, MAC addresses can be specified to connect to
a certain port. This type of firewall can support authentication
[104]. This level of information has some characteristics of the
user’s HW environment which can profile the user activity by
using particular HW.
In “Active Directory Integrated Media Access Control” based
wireless authentication, the Internet Authentication Source (IAS )
needs to be installed on a domain controller to ensure that the
domain controller belongs to the Remote Access Service (RAS )
and IAS source group. To proceed with this process, a Secu-
rity Group in Active Directory is created which should have
the MAC address of the laptop’s Wireless Cards. These are
identified as “Wireless MACs”.
Users are created by using the MAC address as a USER-
NAME and the AP is shared by a secret password. These users
should be controlled by a security group created earlier by the
network administrator. After creating a remote access policy
in the IAS, this will permit remote access through the mem-
bership in the Windows group that was made previously. This
course of action has been taken earlier in “authenticate wireless
MAC accounts, based on group membership” [105]. A unique
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and constant MAC address is transmitted by 802.11 devices
and thus are identifiable. It was recently proposed to replace
such identifiers with pseudonyms, i.e. temporary names which
were unable to be linked to the IT device due to the fact that
implicating identifiers or identifying characteristics of 802.11
networks traffic can identify many users with high accuracy
[106].
Another profiling technique uses four implicit identifiers
visible to the piece of HW to quantify how well a passive ad-
versary can identify users. A lower boundary is placed on how
accurately users can be identified implicitly by using the fol-
lowing:
1. Identifying four previously unrecognized implicit identi-
fiers: network destinations, network names advertised in 802.11
probes, differing configurations of 802.11 options and sizes of
broadcast packets that hint at their contents.
2. Develop an automated procedure to identify users which
quantifies how much information is revealed via implicit iden-
tifiers, both singularly and in multiples, and which can reveal
about several hundred users in three empirical 802.11 traces.
3. The evaluation shows users produce highly discriminat-
ing implicit identifiers. Even a small sample of network traffic
can identify them, i.e. more than half (56%) of the time in
public networks. Moreover, it is most unlikely that they would
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be mistaken as being the source of other network traffic (1% of
the time). Since adversaries will obtain multiple traffic samples
from a user over time, this high level of accuracy in traffic clas-
sification enables them to track many users with even higher
accuracy than in common wireless networks.
4. It is the first time it has been shown with empirical ev-
idence that design considerations beyond eliminating explicit
identifiers, such as unique names and addresses, must be ad-
dressed to protect anonymity in wireless networks.
During the course of this research it was [106] noted that
by considering a subset of all possible identifiers and a weak,
passive adversary, the results only place a lower boundary on
the accuracy with which users can be profiled. The efforts
are continuing to uncover implicit identifiers exposed in 802.11,
such as those exposed by timing channels. The accuracy of the
implicit identifiers over longer timescales and across different
locations will be evaluative, since this study analysis is limited
by the duration and location of the traces.
In 1998 the University of Pittsburgh established a network
connection to residence hall students because the number of
residence hall beds had increased to 6,000 and the connection
rate had continued to increase to 74 percent of resident stu-
dents. Students were implementing a manual process to assign
static IP addresses and record each computer’s MAC address.
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This then required the entry of a username and password each
time the user established a connection. After that, the 2000
Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol Automated Teller Ma-
chine (DHCPATM) was used to provide IP addresses for each
student in conjunction with registration software to record the
necessary machine information. This technique, however, was
considered to be too time consuming for tracking security ac-
tivity [107]. Point-to-Point Protocol over Ethernet “PPPoE”
technology was used to improve the ability of secure access to
the wireless network. So, a single and easy system can be con-
figured and used for all users. In spite of this the wireless or
traditional wired ports connection must be implemented in or-
der to avoid confusion and to offer users flexibility in public
areas without needing to re-authenticate or switch to a dif-
ferent authentication mechanism wireless network [108, 109].
Therefore, using additional HW information may support this
access control approach to avoid the confusion of roaming from
wireless to traditional wired ports in LAN.
Another technique uses specific network security devices.
Network security devices are connected between a protected
client and a network. The network security device negotiates
a session key with another protected client. Then, all commu-
nications between the two clients are encrypted. The device is
self-configuring and locks itself to the IP address of its client.
Thus, the client cannot change its IP address once this has
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been set and therefore cannot emulate the IP address of an-
other client. When a packet is transmitted from the protected
host, the security device translates the MAC address of the
client to its own MAC address before transmitting the packet
into the network. Packets addressed to the host contain the
MAC address of the security device [110].
In order to verify the client’s username and password the
Secure Remote Password protocol (SRP) [111] modular per-
forms large integer exponentiations. This task requires many
operations and consumes a large part of the total execution
time of software implementations of the SRP protocol that are
affected by HW performance. Modifying or designing a suitable
HW environment to accelerate the exponentiations modular in
the SRP protocol [112, 113] is associated to user’s HW and
affects in observing user behaviour.
A mouse is a dynamic biometric that is similar to keystroke
dynamics. The mouse is very important for graphical user in-
terface (GUI ). In contrast, the keyboard is essential for com-
mand line based applications. The behaviour of both these
devices can be combined in a common detector. Adapting
keystroke technology by addressing issues such as passive and
dynamic monitoring could improve the detection [114]. How-
ever both detectors may be affected by the keyword and mouse
environment that motivate the focus in users’ devices which
affect user detection.
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A user’s HW can support a reduction in digital identity
fraud. However, because of natural or analytic HW authenti-
cation, this level of information is related to the user’s confi-
dentiality and integrity which are a primary concern and thus,
any implementation of a new authentication method will have
to be aware of this. In this research, HW information is used
as the authentication factor.
2.5 Neural Network Recognition
A neural network is a set of simple processing elements that ex-
hibit complex global behaviour determined by the connections
between the processing elements and element parameters [115].
A neural network is used to learn procedures through mapping
approximation function about a user’s behaviour. Neural net-
work tools have techniques to achieve high capability of prob-
ability systems [116]. So, the neural network has an adaptive
rate of learning and contains popular techniques to analyse and
profile user behaviour which supports the process of authenti-
cating the use [117].
2.5.1 Neural Network Analysis
Artificial neural networks are the self-processed ”training” of
connecting artificial neurons. Artificial neural networks can be
Chapter 2. Literature Review 53
used to gain an understanding of biological neural networks
without necessarily creating a model of real biological systems
[118]. The biological nervous system is highly complex and
artificial neural network algorithms attempt to abstract this
complexity and focus on what may hypothetically matter most
from an information processing point of view. Neural network
performance is mimicking human error patterns [119]. Good
performance, e.g., as measured by good predictive ability, low
generalisation error, or performance human error patterns, can
then be used as one source of evidence towards supporting the
hypothesis that the abstraction really captured something im-
portant from the point of view of information processing in the
brain. [120] Another incentive for the neural network is to re-
duce the amount of computation required to simulate artificial
neural networks, so as to allow one to experiment with larger
networks and train them on larger data sets.
Artificial Neural Network (ANN) is an information pro-
cessing model that is stimulated by the way biological nervous
systems process information. The key element of this model is
the novel structure of the information processing system. It is
composed of a large number of highly interconnected process-
ing elements (neurons) working in unanimity to solve specific
problems [121].
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2.5.2 Neural Network for Profiling
Multilayer Perceptions (MLP) neural network and Radial Basis
Function (RBF ) networks have become the most widely used
network architectures in pattern classification problems. The
general difference between the two neural networks is that MLP
is a more distributed approach compared to RBF, which only
responds to a limited section input space [122, 123].
Neural networks have the ability to do learn from examples
by using generalising algorithms. This learning can be used to
identify data that have not been seen in the system. A new
type of attack or compromising authorisation can be identified
by the neural generalising algorithm and this ability can help in
the investigation of crimes. In addition, forecasting is used to
predict what will probably occur in the future based on current
information for example a neural network with a forecasting al-
gorithm can give an output predicting who is likely to engage
in bad behaviour [124]. Thus, forecasting algorithms might be
useful for investigators by providing a list of suspicious people.
However, such algorithms might not be beneficial for attacks
perpetrated by outsiders, however are more likely to be useful
for illegal behaviour by people who work in the same organisa-
tion.
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2.5.3 Neural Network for Security
Neural networks have recently been applied to computer secu-
rity and are seen as an improvement over expert systems [125].
Expert systems use a set of security rules acquired from the
knowledge of human experience. They are able to detect at-
tacks which are defined by these rules, however if a new type
of attack is launched, this system may ignore it, leading po-
tentially to great damage to the system. Therefore, an expert
system needs to be regularly updated to correspond to the im-
proved methods by which assailants may try to break down
these systems. Indeed, such updating may sometimes not be
sufficient, because even if an improvement is made to the sys-
tem, it may still not recognize an attack which is made after this
updating has taken place. Due to the ability of neural networks
to deal with new events, basing a computer security system on
an ANN has the advantage of being able to detect any kind
of attack or obtain illegal authority. This ability improves the
mechanism to make the system safe from any new methods
that attackers try to establish. Sammany in [126] state that
a neural network is able to detect users patterns which have
never before been seen in the network system, because it has
the property of generalisation.
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2.5.4 Neural Networks and Intrusion Detection Sys-
tems
A network system needs to be monitored to detect any attacks
that might harm the system such as unauthorised access of
intruders to the network. These attacks are usually detected
by an intrusion detection system [127].
Intrusion detection has two main techniques: anomaly and
misuse detection. The anomaly technique is used to detect
intrusion by seeking unusual behaviour in the network while
misuse detection searches for actions that match descriptions
of assaults known as ’signatures’ which have been applied to
this technique [128]. There are three stages to the creation of
a neural network ID [129]:
1. Gathering data from training: for each day and user,
there should be a vector that represents how often a command
is regularly executed by a user. This can be achieved by having
audit logs applied to each user over several days.
2. Training: the user is recognized by training the neu-
ral network depending on the commands represented by the
vectors.
3. Execution: when the detector identifies a user, it will
state whether this is a known user. If not, the system recognizes
this user as an attacker.
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In this research, user behaviour information will be col-
lected by monitoring typing patterns on the computer key-
board. Neural networks will learn this information based on
particular environment.
2.5.5 Neural Network Anomaly Detection
In anomaly detection systems, artificial neural networks have
been applied as a substitute for statistical analysis. In sta-
tistical analysis techniques, an attacker is recognized by com-
paring normal with current behaviour [130]. Neural networks
were specifically proposed to identify the typical characteristics
of system users and identify statistically significant variations
from the user’s established behaviour.
2.5.6 Neural Network Misuse Detection
The methods of network assaults are continuously changing, so
a system is required which is flexible in defence and protection
and which is able to analyse the huge amount of data in the
network. Neural networks have the ability to analyse informa-
tion from the network, even if it is incomplete or inaccurate.
Furthermore, its learning ability enables it to detect dangerous
attacks in cases where many attackers strike the network at the
same time. ANNs are also very fast, allowing them to detect an
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attack before it can cause great damage [131]. Their learning
ability protects the network from any attack that has been seen
before because the system has discovered the attributes of this
attack from previous events.
2.6 Summary
The previous chapter presented background about authentica-
tion factors and approach in access control in Section 2.1 fol-
lowed by focusing in profiling factors and technique to vitrify
the user and answering research question Q.1. by addressing
hardware usage in authentication. Then, Section 2.4 declares
hardware information and hardware usage in authentication
which indicates research question Q.2. and clarifies hardware
characteristics to be used in profiling the user. Finally, Section
2.5 demonstrate neural network usage in profiling and recog-
nizing user behaviour in security systems.
This chapter established one of the important weak point
in computer authentication. This weak point is how to protect
authentication identity keys from been used fraudulently and
are users/hackers protected from being captured. As result of
the literature review in previous chapter, the following limita-
tion need to be addressed to improve authentication methods:
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L.1. Password authentication is not reliable due to the
users inability to keep them secret; passwords are prone to
dictionary or rainbow-table attacks as well as the ease with
which social engineering techniques can obtain passwords that
is clarified in section 2.1.1.
L.2. Current authentication approaches to MFA are expen-
sive and difficult to deploy which is increase the cost to profile
the use (See Section 2.2).
One of extending behavioural profiling research in informa-
tion security is measuring deviant behaviour by data collection
and measurement issues, e.g., improving methods for collect-
ing and measuring security related data to capture actual be-
haviour [132].
Profiling user behaviour can improve the authentication
method to trust the user because of the profiling identity is re-
ferring to a person which has description of the characteristics
of a person. This profiling is based on using methods of recogni-
tion to analyse and then identify specific user behaviour, e.g.,
keystrokes in typing the authentication keys. However, pro-
filing user behaviour requires additional accessories and needs
system capability to observe user patterns in any context to
determine user behaviour.
Computer HW environments have physical characteristics.
These physical characteristics are a) fixed and physical gates
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to use digital resources for one user or more and b) difficult
to tamper with. So, how should we use computer device char-
acteristics to improve profiling techniques in authentication?.
Profiling HW information can be used to discriminate against
the valid use of password credentials against the misuse of pass-
word credentials by an attacker, without complicating the au-
thentication process or incurring large extra costs.
The next chapter will discuss the methodology of profiling
user’s activity using HW information. This discussion deter-
mines HW authentication and user profiling “HAUP” approach
frameworks to build new authentication approaches. The next
chapter provides HMSPNs contributions to improve the tradi-




1. Define authentication in HW life cycle.
2. Introduce HW activity and user’s be-
haviour.
3. Formalise analyse and explore HW ap-
proach.
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This chapter provides an overview of the proposed frame-
work which is concerned with the process of building the “au-
thentication approach” based on the use of HW information in
traditional “username and password” technique. Section 3.1
provides key methods and motivations which determine the
HW technique and characteristics to be used in the authenti-
cation framework. Section 3.2 explains the HW authentication
procedures which are required to observe HW information and
monitor user behaviour (Bh) during the HW life cycle
Section 3.3 explains how to analyse HW characteristics to
profile the user. Then, section 3.4 outlines the HW authentica-
tion framework. Section 3.5 provides HW approach procedures
to be implicated in the traditional user name and password
technique. Section 3.6 provides the HW authentication ap-
proach to check user HW and Bh as authentication procedure in
access control. Following this, section 3.7 presents the HW con-
tribution in profiling a user to reduce the potential of identity
fraud. Finally, section 3.8 determines the main requirements
which are necessary to implement the HW authentication ap-
proach.
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3.1 Method
Users can’t assume the pattern of somebody else when he or she
deals with a particular computer device because of the profiling
inability to have comprehensive observation for user’s environ-
ment when the computer device is used. However, there is a
possibility to establish a profiling map to trust the user. Users’
computer devices which have been used to get the authority
may hold significant information about the user, e.g., the com-
puter device may been used in successful login attempts by the
same user or other users in previous usage. Can the security
systems use computer devices characteristics in authentication?
The main physical and digital requirements which allow
users of information technology to compromise other users are
computer device and authentication keys (See Chapter 2 Sec-
tion 2.6). This raises the question of how to access the control
techniques that profile the user using these basic requirements?
Each person has their own usage pattern when he or she
uses any computer machine or smart device (See Chapter 2,
Section 2.2.2). A user’s Bh and pattern is recognized by their
performance and device analysis which is a significant factor
in profiling the user. If this is the case, this also raises the
question of whether the computer device develops the profiling
by exploring the relation between user behaviour and pattern
every successful log-in attempt.
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Every user has the right to keep using a particular or variety
of HW to perform authority in IT services. In this approach,
physical information is considered as the user’s contextual en-
vironment during the authentication process. This approach
records an advanced impression of the occurrence of misuse
which is considered as a user’s HW environment and contains
a user’s characteristic. These characteristics recognize a user’s
physical Bh for profiling aims. This recognition of user Bh
came as a result of using a particular computer device by a
user. This information can be reused together with user Bh
and usage profiles as an authentication approach to identify
malicious access behaviour.
The HW approach is the process of profiling the way in
which a user’s device has been utilised to obtain the author-
ity to access control for every successful log-in attempt. This
process motivates a user’s machine to analyse and determine
the user’s Bh by using, in particular, HW as an authentication
factor.
This research explores the use of HW information as an em-
bodied identity to recognize and analyse a user’s environment
in order to use the results for profiling user behaviour. In ad-
dition, the research also clarifies the similarity between user’s
Bh and patterns based on using specific HW by a user to get
access.
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Following HW characteristics motivate to use HW infor-
mation in profiling user’s activity to develop profiling a user in
traditional “username/password” authentication approach:
M.1. Computer HW has significant information (HMSPNs).
M.2. Computer HW information is difficult to tamper with.
M.3. Computer HW information is considered a user envi-
ronment during performing access requests.
M.4. Computer HW information has particular charac-
teristics that are encouraged to be used in profiling at access
control.
Moreover, HW configuration can be reused, together with
user activity and usage profiles, to identify malicious behaviour.
Profile usage can be obtained by correlating the HW config-
uration and user Bh when accessing information technology
services. Chapter 4 clarifies the HW profiling technique to au-
thenticate the user in access control threshold.
3.2 HW Authentication in HW Life Cycle
HW parts also have a specific usage history by sorting the
users based on HW usage. Some computer HW parts have not
changed and have been used by the manufacturer for a long
time. Every computer device has a history which is tracked
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during the time of its life cycle. In other words, every single
computer’s HW has a specific record of usage by all users from
manufacture to destruction.
If a user has been using the same device and following the
same log-in procedure for a long time this user will have a par-
ticular pattern in using a particular device. Therefore, the user
has a particular pattern range that will be used to recognize
user Bh based on specific HW. If the number of users of a partic-
ular device increases, the access control system recognizes HW
performance to recognize how users behave when the author-
ity is taken. For example, user keystroke Bh is captured when
the username and password keys are typed by calculating the
keystroke speed and user typing rhythm, even if a group of users
use the same username and password. Of course, the sharing
of accounts is bad practice, but is still commonly encountered
in both domestic and corporate environments over which the
service provider has little influence. Figure 3.1 shows the users
the two users Bob and Colin used John’s HW, however they
have different behaviours in dealing with same HW.
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Figure 3.1: HW and Users Bh Life Cycle
HW life cycle in Figure 3.1 explains conceptually the HW
usage. HW usage provides the opportunity to learn users’ Bh
depending on a particular HW configuration. However, the HW
parts may change over time resulting in configurations that are
distinctive to previous log-in attempts by their users. For ex-
ample, the log-in may be typed on the touch screen or (after
attaching the tablet to a docking station) through a physical
keyboard. These changes in HW configurations affect the user
profiling. “Step 1” and “Step 2” in Figure 3.1 reflect changing
HW parts and thus a change of user’s environments. Therefore,
the HW approach has to recognize changes in HW and deter-
mine users’ HW at every log-in attempt. As a result, using
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HW information in the HW authentication approach in access
control could be a new factor to profile and verify the user that
is detected by a user’s computer HW configuration behaviour.
The HW authentication approach records and analyses the
different patterns of users’ Bh when they use the same HW
environment and the same username and password. A HW au-
thentication technique maps users’ computer HW environments
in order to recognize the user patterns in particular HW.
Profiling Bh techniques are based on recognizing users’
unique biometric Bh denoted in chapter 2.2. However, profil-
ing behavioural techniques cannot determine when, and which,
particular physical feature is executed that recognizes the user’s
environment when observing user Bh techniques. HW profil-
ing focuses on user behaviour depending on a particular en-
vironment and observes the methods of behaviour. The HW
approach provides a level of trust which depends on the pro-
file of a user’s computer behaviour in traditional username and
passwords authentication with respect to HW activity. Figure
3.2 illustrates the HW profiling technique and factors in HW
authentication approach.
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Figure 3.2: HW Method for HW Approach
3.3 Authentication HW Analysis
When a user attempts to log-in using identity authentication,
namely username and passwords, HW authentication analyses
user’s HW environment by collecting three HW manufacture
serial parts numbers. This HW configuration explores whether
the user has used the current HW in log-in procedure previ-
ously. If so the HW authentication approach calculates how
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many times the user has used the current HW log-in. If the
user did not use the current log-in previously, the HW authen-
tication approach deals with the current HW as “manufactured
HW first usage” and this approach is the technique to be used
to observe user’s behaviour.
So, if “First usage” the HW authentication approach can-
not profile user behaviour due to the lack of the user’s patterns
being previously recorded. In if “First usage” the approach
can redirect the user to another verification approach, e.g., ad-
ditional password. However, the HW approach begins to learn
the user’s pattern from first usage to recognize the user’s pat-
terns to be used in the following profiling user’s behaviour in
the next successful log-in attempt.
Following Table 3.1 demonstrates an example of particular
HW usage by 6 users. In this example, three particular HW
parts are assumed to being the user environment when suc-
cessful login attempt occurred. These HW parts are a) Media
Access Control MAC Address; b) Storage Media Manufacture
Serial Part Number; and c) Motherboard or BIOS Number.
Using three hardware parts simplifies HW authentication ap-
proach in this research and will be improved by using more HW
parts in further development stages.
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Table 3.1: Profiling User’s HW
# User Successful Log-in MAC Storage BIOS
1 Peter 3 00-1C-C0-E6-38-4C 82566DM-2 AZCB927006JW
2 Linda 546 00-1C-C0-E6-38-4C 82566DM-2 AZCB927006JW
3 Cress 255 00-27-0E-20-6F-0D SAMSUNGHD CNF8375GR0
4 Antonio 456 00-1E-68-F3-44-C4 3COM113321d 2A5LAH09C
5 Antonio 1 00-1C-C0-6D-6E-AA 3COM212121N 2A5LAH09C
6 Colin 0 00-1C-C0-E6-38-4C 3COM113321d CNF8375GR0
In Table 3.1 in first example we assume that there are three
users, namely: Linda HW number of successful log-in attempts
(546), Cress HW number of successful log-in attempts (255)
and Antonio HW number of successful attempts (456) that
have used their HW to access their accounts for many success-
ful attempts. If HW is used for many log-in attempts, HW is
trusted as a log-in environment and the HW authentication ap-
proach recognizes the physical HW. This HW information can
disseminate user behaviour in a particular HW environment.
In the second example, we note that users Linda and Peter
use the same HW at every successful log-in. The HW informa-
tion recognizes that group of users use same HW.
In the third example, Antonio HW number of last successful
log-in attempt (1) has changed two of his computer HW parts
(MAC address and Storage media), so the level of trust in the
HW authentication approach should recognize HW changing
has influenced the profiling of the user’s behaviour.
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In the fourth example, we assume Colin tries to compro-
mise another user’s HW or perhaps Colin is using his friend
computer. Colin has used HW information from another users
HW which affects the HW trust. Trusting a user’s HW can play
a significant factor in recognizing user’s behaviour using partic-
ular HW. User movement between one or many HW affects the
ability to observe biometric behaviour. This HW information
requires additional factors to trust the users’ which is based on
the HW environment.
If a user keeps using particular HW during every success-
ful log-in attempts, the HW approach learns that the user is
familiar with this particular HW and the HW authentication
approach determines the HW user pattern based on particu-
lar HW. The level of trust can be increased because the user
behaviour is observed by the HW approach through using the
same HW at every successful log-in attempt because the user
will have particular pattern in using particular HW. However,
if the user behaviour in using particular hardware is not similar
to user pattern the level of trust is decreased and may required
additional verification method to authenticate the user. Figure
3.3 illustrate how HW method can support the level of trust to
authenticate the user.
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Figure 3.3: HW Method in User Authenticate
The level of trust a user is increases dramatically when HW
approach learns user pattern and the user Bh is not change
every successful log-in. So, In HW authentication approach
the level of trust a user will be based on profiling the following
three factors:
F.1. Successful log-in attempt using “username/password”.
F.2. User HW that is used at every successful log-in at-
tempt procedure.
F.3. User Bh every successful log-in procedure including.
3.4 Design HAUP Framework
The HAUP framework is located in ’access control edge’. The
HAUP framework starts when the user has requested to gain
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the authority using the log-in application from a particular
computer device and finishes with giving a level of trust for
the user. The HAUP framework has two parts; the first part is
located in the client device which collects the user’s HW and
behaviour. The second part is allocated in the server side to
analyse HW usage and behaviour from stored patterns in the
HW database that has previous HW usage analysis. In the
server side the HAUP controller calculates the similarity be-
tween the current user Bh and the previous user’s patterns to
present the level of trust. Figure 3.4 shows the general frame-





















Figure 3.4: Framework Overview for Designing HAUP Aspect
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3.5 Analysing Hardware Authentication and
User Behaviour
HW authentication focuses on Analysing Hardware Authenti-
cation and User Profiling (HAUP). The HAUP approach checks
users computer HW authentication and focuses on analysing
hardware authentication and user Bh. The HAUP approach
checks users’ computer HW parts at every successful log-in at-
tempt which may have been affected by a change either partly
or completely of these HW parts depending on the time of the
day, week or month that the user has used the computer which
could, in turn, affect the user’s Bh. For example, if the user has
changed his keyboard, the HAUP approach have to recognize
the new keyboard to create the required level of trust because
this change may effect in recognizing userbehaviour.
The HW authentication approach depends on a minimum
of three mandatory HW part numbers. For example, when a
user uses more than one device with the same log-in during
the day e.g. desk top computer at work, smart mobile phone
and laptop, the HW authentication approach should recognize
the changing of user’s Bh environment because the method of
HW observation also have changed. In addition, the HAUP
approach learns user Bh sequentially from first usage and this
learning is reflected in the user’s level of trust which increases
at every successful log-in attempt.
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Analysis of user-typing patterns on a particular HW is dis-
criminating username and password keys by monitoring user
Bh in dealing with particular keyboards. Moreover, every com-
puter device has particular profiling about user’s pattern. Rec-
ognizing user Bh should be aware of HW to profile the user’s
reliability.
This correlation between user’s Bh and HW is reducing the
False Accept Rate and False Reject Rate rates and allows the
approach to be deployed throughout heterogeneous approach
which are comprised of various HW interfaces. For example,
in Figure 3.5 the user uses four different HW during the day.
The user uses the same username and password to log-in to the
system by particular HW at specific time. HAUP is profiling
the user based on the HW information which is related to par-
ticular time. This analysis discriminates user Bh in particular
HW at particular time which observe user pattern when the
use performance change during the day.
Analysis of user-typing patterns on a particular HW is
based on monitoring user Bh in dealing with particular key-
boards. Moreover, every computer device has particular profil-
ing about user’s pattern. Recognizing user Bh should be aware
of HW to profile the user reliably. This correlation is reduc-
ing the FAR and FRR rates and allows the approach to be
deployed throughout heterogeneous approach which are com-
prised of various HW interfaces. For example, in Figure 3.5 the
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user uses four different HW during the day. The user uses same
“username/password” to log-in to the system by particular HW
at specific time. HAUP is profiling the user based on the HW
information which is related to particular time. This analy-
sis discriminates user Bh in particular HW at particular time








UN PWD MAC Storage media MB Type Keystroke Log-in  time 
Simon Bfr432c 00-1C-C0-E6-38-4C 1670299433 82566DM-2 PC .02-.04 millisecond 08:00–09:00 
Simon Bfr432c 00-27-0E-20-6F-0D SAMSUNH16T 2A5LAH09C Smart-Phone .06-.09 millisecond 16:00–18:00 
Simon Bfr432c 00-1E-68-F3-44-C4 3COM212121N VT8366 Laptop .01-.03 millisecond 18:00–21:00 












































Figure 3.5: Main Authentication Factors
HW and user Bh profiling combinations have three main
factors to authenticate a user. The first factor is the traditional
authentication factor which is the username and password. The
second factor is user’s Bh within a particular HW environment.
The third factor is the user’s HW which is the infrastruc-
ture element which is necessary to learn user Bh. Figure 3.6
illustrates the HAUP steps to determine the level of trust in a
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user. If more than one user uses the same HW for log-in, the
HAUP approach is required to determine how the HW have an
influence in the user Bh.
 
1- Knowledge factor 
Typing UN/PWD 
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Figure 3.6: Overview of Dependencies of HW Authentication Factors
3.6 HAUP Approach Analysis
The HAUP approach provides two components in the log-in
procedure. Whilst the user is typing his or her username and
password, the first component captures the current user Bh by
calculating the keystrokes (both key-press and release) speed
when username and password are typed. The second compo-
nent collects the HW information which consists of the user’s
current HW configuration. As the user or other security soft-
ware installed on the client device can prevent the gathering of
HW information, we consider this to be optional information.
However, if this information is not provided it has detrimental
Chapter 3. Introduction to HAUP 79
effects on the accuracy of the HAUP approach as the HW profil-
ing information is coupled with the selection of the user-profile
for keystroke recognition.
When the user performs access using particular computer
HW, the approach begins to analyse and compare the current
HW configuration with the established profile of that user that
is stored in the server side to determine the similarity of the
Bh. If the user has used the current HW before, the approach
computes the similarity between the current keystroke Bh of the
user and the Bh that has been recorded against this hardware
configuration previously. If the current HW configuration is
not in the database, the component compares the user pattern
against all known keystroke Bhs for that user, indiscriminate
of the HW configuration. This obviously reduces the efficiency
of this approach.
As a result, the HW similarity test reflects the idea that the
HW that has been previously used by the same user increases
the likelihood of the user being genuine, as this rules out attacks
in which passwords have been observed by shoulder surfing or
rainbow table attacks. Uncharacteristic use of HW, e.g. the
use of a company PC that has regularly been used during office
hours for a period of 6 months which now has an access taking
place at 2am in the early hours of the morning, will be flagged
up by a low trust level in the HW.
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3.7 HW Information Contribution in HAUP
Approach
The HAUP is a MFA technique that discriminates traditional
username and password factors and, in particular, Bhal factors
by analysing HW characteristics. The HAUP approach binds
between these three sequential and dependent factors based on
the traditional username and password log-in function. HAUP
concentrates on user HW environments that affect user per-
formance. Using HW information discriminates the profiling
technique to accurately determine usage patterns carried out
by the user.
The HAUP approach is built in “MHSPNs” accessories ’on
their own’ to improve the authentication technique by deter-
mining user environments and by using low profiling costs. Ad-
ditional factors that are implicit in monitoring users’ HW Bh
in the particular HW are given specific log-in keys text, i.e.,
the username and password.
3.8 HAUP Approach Analysis Requirements
Implementing the HAUP approach necessitates the following
requirements:
R.1. Collecting HW information from user’s devices.
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R.2. Analysing the history of the usage of HW.
R.3. Capture and collect user Bh after every successful
log-in attempt in the access control threshold in user’s devices.
R.4. Analysing user Bh in using current HW from previous
successful log-ins.
R.5. Find the similarity between users’ patterns and cur-
rent users’ Bh when the same HW is used.
R.6. Determine the level of trust for the user based on the
correlation between users’ patterns and Bh.
3.9 HAUP Success Criteria
HW information can support profiling systems in access control
if HW is considered as a user environment to recognize user Bh.
HW information can support profiling a user if the user keeps
using particular HW at every successful log-in attempt. So, the
HAUP system criteria success is based on the following:
1) Hardware availability at every log-in attempt which is
essential to identify user Bh in particular HW.
2) Profiling Bh ability to clarify user Bh. This profiling re-
quires more than one technique, e.g., recognizing typing rhythm
and speed, which supports to observe user patterns.
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3) User ability to perform his/her Bh at every successful
log-in attempt that related to his/her normal pattern. This
ability gives the opportunity to learn user patterns and find
the similarity between user Bh and patterns at every successful
log-in attempt.
3.10 Summary
This chapter clarified new method to improve traditional au-
thentication approach using HW information. Section 3.1 de-
termined HW information characteristics to be used as authen-
tication factor in access control. Then, section 3.2 demon-
strated HW information availability during log-in procedure
to be used in profiling the user that provided clear answer for
research question Q.3. by addressing the methodology of us-
ing HW information to profile the user which aims to research
objective O.2. by selecting suitable characteristic for profil-
ing. After that, 3.3 presented more clarification and examples
to analyse user HW in access control to profile the user that
answer the research question Q.4 by addressing HW charac-
teristics. Section, 3.4 clarified general framework to use HW
in traditional authentication approach which is the first contri-
bution C.1.(framework for Multi-factor authentication based
on hardware and user Bh) of this research and conducted the
research objective O.4. by implementing set of experiments.
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Section 3.5 and section 3.6 focus in analysing HW and user
Bh that improved profiling the user to determine user pat-
tern. Section 3.7 demonstrated HAUP approach advantages
that clarified research question Q.5 (What is the added cost of
a profiling approach?) answer by decreasing profiling cost and
determined the main analysis requirements to successes HAUP
approach in section 3.8. Finally, section 3.9 determine the suc-
cess criteria to evaluate HAUP. So, using HW information as
profiling factors to determine a user’s Bh can increase the ef-
fectiveness of observing a user’s patterns. Profiling a user’s
pattern in particular HW identifies hackers misuse in user Bh.
The HAUP approach profiles a user’s Bh based on HW in-
formation to categorise user Bh in particular HW environments.
This approach has the potential to reduce identity fraud with-
out additional accessories’ costs or inconveniencing the user.
This chapter presented the HW authentication approach anal-
ysis to draw the HAUP framework.
The next chapter will discuss the HAUP system design and
procedures to declare HAUP architecture and then implement
the HAUP prototype in chapter 6. The next chapter will pro-
vide an authentication system analysis using HW and Bh rec-
ognizer when the traditional “username/password” approach is





1. Introduce the framework.
3. Describe the components.
2. Define the architecture.
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This chapter discusses the HAUP framework that provides
user pattern analysis based on HW information. This frame-
work uses profiling of user behaviour methods based on an anal-
ysis of user HW activity in accordance with “HMSPN’s”. Sec-
tion Section 4.1 provides an overview of the HAUP framework
to recognize user HW activity and profile users’ methods and
behaviour. After that, section 4.2 provides HAUP system ar-
chitecture and determines the procedures between the HAUP
system components. Section 4.3 provides HAUP system proce-
dures to read users’ HW and recognize users’ behaviour when
using the traditional username and password authentication.
4.1 HAUP Framework
When following the authentication process, the client uses the
application to contact the server. The server responds by send-
ing the security requirement; for example, using the Secure
Socket layer (SSL) and Digital Certificate. This procedure se-
cures the authentication identity during the communication
session. For example, using an encrypted method (such as
MD5) and private and public keys to secure every log-in session
between the client and server.
The HAUP framework in Figure 4.1 builds on the current
username and password and include HW information and the
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user’s behaviour in the authentication procedure as the user’s
profiling procedure. The HAUP framework has an additional
controller component in the client side which has two main pro-
cedures. The first procedure reads the user’s HW information
which is the “HW observer” and observes the client’s behaviour
when typing the traditional username and password keys using
a “behaviour observer”. This identity information is associated
and encrypted to be sent as ’log-in identities’ with the username
and password’ through the network.
HW information is used before
2. HAUP profile






























Figure 4.1: HAUP framework
After the security certificate procedures are applied and the
client’s identities reach the server, the HAUP framework in the
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server side receives the client’s log-in request which includes
three identifiers username and password, HW information and
client’s behaviour. A handler component in the server side then
receives every log-in request separately. For example, using
a thread in java script in the server to serve more than one
client at the same time. Then, the handler component sends
the client’s identity to a trust engine component controller to
manage the authentication keys.
The trust engine component controller sends the username
and password to ’Pluggable Authentication Module’ (PAM)
components in order to check if the username and password are
valid or not. If they are not valid, the system sends an ’incor-
rect password’ message to inform the client and ask the client
to re-enter a valid password and/or username. If the username
and password are valid, the engine controller sends the client’s
HW and Bh to the “recognizer” components. This recognizer
component determines the client’s patterns from the profil-
ing database component using a profiling component which
searches for the previous client pattern in the same received
HW information.
If the HW has not been used by the client, this means the
client did not use the current HW previously and the client pat-
tern is not observed. In this case, the HAUP framework redi-
rects the client to another verification question or approach. If
the HW has been used by the client and is found in profiling
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database, the profiling component observes the client pattern
from the previous usage. Finally, the trust engine controller
performs a comparison by profiling the current client behaviour
and profiling the previous pattern based on the same HW and
calculating the similarity between the client behaviour and pat-
tern. This calculation shows the level of trust based on the
HAUP authentication factors.
4.2 Main HAUP System Components and
Architecture
The HAUP system depends on two components in the both
server and client sides to profile the client during the log-in
procedure in the client’s devices. The first component cap-
tures and observes the client’s behaviour and HW from client
side. This information is encrypted and sent to the server side.
Figure 4.2 shows the high level HAUP architecture including
components.
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Figure 4.2: High Level HAUP Architecture
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In the server side the HAUP component carries out profil-
ing component checks to establish if the client used the current
HW before by accessing the client’s profiling database. If so,
this component analyses the relationship between the current
and the previous client’s HW. The second component relates
to the level of trust and here the component observes the sim-
ilarity between the current client behaviour and the previous
client’s pattern when the client used the current HW in a pre-
viously successful log-in attempt. This component determines
the level of trust by highlighting the relationship between the
client’s behaviour and pattern in respect of the ’HMSPNs’ en-
vironment.
Figure 4.3 shows details of HAUP system architecture and
declares recognizing client’s behaviour procedures when the
traditional username and password checking procedure is in
progress.
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Figure 4.3: Details of HAUP System Architecture
4.2.1 HAUP Recognizer
The HAUP process takes into account previous HW usage and
client patterns over time and also considers other aspects such
as concurrent usage of the same HW configuration in different
log-in processes which, for example, could indicate a spoofing
attack. HAUP system architecture process requirements are:
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1. Trust level based on usage of HW configurations.
2. Known HW configurations for use in behaviour recognition
(or matching configuration).
3. Cross log-in analysis for unauthenticated detection.
The trust level is computed against the history of previous
log-in-attempts and their associated HW configurations which
is drawn from the sequence of previous successful log-in at-
tempts by this client.
 
00:00 
Day time  
User’s office machine 




Figure 4.4: HW History During the Day
Figure 4.4 shows a simplified example. Every node on the
timeline represents a successful log-in by the client in question.
The HW configuration that is used by particular client during
the day is depicted by the shape of the node, e.g. the empty
circle is the client’s office machine, the square is a mobile device
and the filled circle is the client’s home computer.
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1. The first step is to decide whether the HW has been
used before. This is important for the keystroke recognizer
in subsequent checks as it establishes a baseline trust for the
access in case the HW is known.
2. Secondly, the access is viewed in the context of the other
accesses (left neighbours), the time and the day of the access.
We chose metrics based on the time of day and the day in the
week as these constitute the majority of repetitions we have
encountered during the HW analysis usage. Currently HAUP
system architecture doesn’t support more complex analysis of
these events in the HAUP prototype, but envisage the use of
neural networks or support vector machines to establish a be-
haviour baseline against which the check can be performed.
Based on the “fit” of the HW configuration used in the log-in,
the trust level is adjusted.
3. Thirdly, the HW recognizer maintains a cache of recent
and current log-in activities over the entire client-base. If there
is a current log-in from the same HW configuration or configu-
rations that share particular HW components there is a chance
that one of the log-ins could be fraudulent and based on spoofed
HW information. It is known that some HW manufacturers fail
to provide unique serial numbers for their components. For the
known cases there is a blacklist of manufacturer IDs which are
excluded from this analysis step. A collision of using another
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client’s HW here reduces the trust level established by the HW
HW recognizer.
4.2.2 Client Behaviour recognizer
The HW client behaviour recognizer considers the press and re-
lease times as a proof of concept and does not use other correla-
tions between subsequent key press events that may be further
improving the accuracy. As the contribution of this research is
not a novel keystroke recognition scheme however is the inte-
gration of multiple approaches, this mechanism can be replaced
with more sophisticated techniques such as specific keystroke
recognition [69].
The keystroke recognizer takes the current keystroke be-
haviour entered by the client behaviour and matches it against
the previous recorded keystroke behaviour of that client using
that HW.
In the HAUP system, a keystroke pattern is characterised
by the press and release times of the keys that are used in
entering the username and password and is gathered on the
client side. Figure 4.5 gives an example of such a pattern.
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Figure 4.5: client’s Keystroke Patterns in Particular Hardware
In this research the HW authentication builds trust-metrics
which are based on whether the current keystroke pattern fits
the users profile information where the profile is created based
on the previous user inputs. For example, with respect to Fig-
ure 4.5 the first key event is the time the letter “u” is pressed.
Previous log-ins, e.g., the recorded times in Table 4.1 which
forms the user profile, as depicted in Figure 4.6.
Table 4.1: Keystroke Profiling Against HW Configuration
# 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
u↓ 10 8 9 11 15 8 10 8 11 6 12
u↑ 10 8 9 11 15 8 10 8 11 6 12
s↓ 6 5 7 8 9 6 7 6 8 5 8
s↑ 15 10 10 12 20 12 11 10 12 12 10
The HAUP approach looks at the variance of the data and
the percentile into which the current keystroke pattern falls
with respect to each key press and release event and com-
putes an accumulated trust level over all events contained in
the keystroke pattern. In comparison to, for example, specific
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keystroke recognition [73]. This is a very simple approach which















Successful Log-in Attempt 
Figure 4.6: Profiling User’s Keystroke Behaviour
4.3 HAUP Authentication Process
The HAUP system has two procedures in the client side when
the traditional username and password log-in procedure is in
progress. Whilst the user ’u’ is typing the username and pass-
word the first procedure captures the user’s behaviour by cal-
culating the keystroke (both key press and release) speed when
the username and password are typed. The second procedure
collects the HW information which consists of the user’s current
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HW configuration. As the security software installed on the
client machine can prevent the gathering of HW information,
the HAUP system considers this to be optional information.
However, if this information is not provided, it has a detrimen-
tal effect on the accuracy of the HAUP mechanism as the HW
profiling information is coupled with the selection of the user
profile for keystroke recognition.
In the server side the HAUP has two additional procedures.
When the log-in identity is received and approved as valid in
the server side, the first HAUP procedure checks if the HW has
been used by the current user or not. If used, the second pro-
cedure recognizes the similarity between user’s behaviour and
pattern based on the HW usage and calculate level of trust for
the user. If the HW is new for the HAUP system or is unknown,
HAUP redirects the user for another verification approach. Fig-
ure 4.7 illustrates the HAUP procedures and interaction [133].
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Figure 4.7: General Overview of HAUP Flow Diagram between System
Components
If the user provides access to the HW profile, the HAUP
system begins to analyse and compare the previous HW con-
figuration with the established profile of that user is used in
current successful log-in attempt to determine their similar-
ity. If the user has used the current HW before, the HAUP
system computes the similarity between the current keystroke
behaviour of the user and in particular the HW that has been
recorded against this HW configuration previously.
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Given that the username and password checks are success-
fully passed, the HAUP system computes the similarity be-
tween the HW configuration and the associated keystroke be-
haviour similarity to profile two levels of trust. If only the
keystroke information is available then only one level of trust
is being used. Similarly, the keystroke behaviour is evaluated
and linked against the used HW configuration if available.
The HAUP system authenticates normally if the username
and password are correct and a threshold in both levels of trust
is passed. If the username and password do not match, the
authentication is considered as failed. If the username and
password are correct and only a low level of trust is established
based on the HW or keystroke behaviour, the system can be
configured to adapt to the level of trust. For example, the
authentication can be failed; the user can be authenticated with
reduced privileges such as only being able to view his account
details; the HAUP system can increase the threshold for an
intrusion detection system that identifies fraudulent activity
based on the transactions that are undertaken or even redirect
the user to a honey pot trapping system to explore if the user
is a hacker using a spoofed username and password. In an e-
banking context, this could mean to delay the transactions and
attempt to contact the user via a different media such as email
or phone.
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4.4 Summary
This chapter introduced the HAUP framework in section 4.1
including the main components to implement HW authentica-
tion approach. This framework achieve the research objective
O.4. (Develop a framework that supports the mathematical
model) by detecting the system components and architecture
that provide the contribution C.4. (Demonstrate the feasibil-
ity of the approach by implementing a set of experiments) by
providing feasible HAUP framework that implement this work
and collect data from set of experiments. Section 4.2 deter-
mined and explained the HAUP architecture and included the
HAUP system components which are required to implement
the HAUP prototype based on HW characteristics. Section 4.3
presented the mechanism of HAUP components to be impli-
cated in the traditional username and password authentication
including the flow digram procedures that clarified answer for
the research question Q.5.(What is the added cost of a profiling
approach? How can costs to be avoided?) by noting the HW
information affect to implement the approach.
The next chapter provides a formal model to define HAUP
profiling mathematically and support the HAUP authentica-
tion process to build a level of trust.
Chapter 5
Mathematical Model of HAUP
Objectives
1. Provide model description.
2. Explain the domain.
3. Present the formal model.
4. Describe the backward propagation.
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This chapter provides the mathematical model that defines
the HAUP approach. This mathematical model determines the
authentication factors to be calculated and combined in the
level of trust. Section 5.1 provides assumptions and analysis
of the domain for hardware profiling. Section 5.2 provides an
illustrative example using hardware information to explain the
mathematical model. Section 5.3 provides the mathematical
modelling for user behaviour illustrating the hardware influence
in recognizing users behaviours. Sub section 5.3.1 describes the
neural network for the analysis of user behaviour.
5.1 Formal HAUP Analysis
The HAUP trust function is based on a data model for com-
paring profiling information obtained in previous and current
log-in procedures. In the HAUP approach, hardware informa-
tion and user behaviour are considered the main authentication
factors.
5.1.1 Domains
The following declares the domain model:
1- Trust is modelled as a weighted function T that maps
from a log-in context l ∈ L and an existing hardware profile
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α ∈ A and Behaviour profile β ∈ B to a value in [0, 1]. So, T :
L×A×B → [0, 1] and U is user who perform log-in procedure.
2- S is sequence of log-in attempts l, initially S = {}.
So, S = {l1, l2, l3, ......, ln}. Every log-in has four factors l =
{pi, ci, bi, ti} where i is log-in sequence index. So, the user has
previous log-in attempts and l1.....ln−1. The current log-in at-
tempt is ln. The factors are: pi user’s username and password
in current log-in attempt using cn by specific behaviour bn at
particular time tn.
S = {p1, c1, b1, t1} , {p2, c1, b1, t2} , .......... {pn, cn, bn, tn}
Sc is the sequence of log-in attempts using particular con-
figuration c
Sc = {l ∈ S|l.c = c}
Similarity Sc,p,t: is the sequence for user u ∈ U used c
configuration in successfully log-in at particular time t. These
authentication factors has similarity characteristics about the
user activity. The similarity of this factors in every successful
log-in attempt can be used to profile the user and determine
the access control threshold.
3- wα and wβ are weights that can be chosen to vary the
influences of Hardware Trust and Behaviour Trust.
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                                           Tα(ℓ, α)  wα     +   Tβ(ℓ, β)  wβ                 if p matches 
                                            0                      else. 
 Where    wα +   wβ   = 1  
 # 1)         T(ℓ,  α,  β ) = 
Let Tα be a function modelling Hardware Trust, and Tβ be
a function modeleing Behaviour Trust.
Tα : L× A→ [0, 1]
Mapping from a log-in context l ∈ L and a hardware profile
α ∈ A to a trust value in [0, 1]
Tβ : L×B → [0, 1]
Similarly Tβ is a function modelling Behaviour trust, map-
ping from a log-in context l ∈ L and a behaviour profile β ∈ B
to trust value [0, 1].
5.1.2 Hardware configuration
Every computer is assumed to have particular hardware (HW )
parts. HW is a set of all possible hardware in user machine.
Let C be the set of all possible configurations and define a
configurations to be three of distinct HW. In HAUP, three hard-
ware parts are considered (Network card part number, Hard
disk number and BIOS number).
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c = {〈mi,mj,mk〉 : mi,mj,mk ∈ HW ∧mi 6= mj 6= mk}
We define the similarity function to determine the similarity
between two configurations c and c̄ that are used in log-in l
procedures. However, number of HW parts can increase in the
future work that discriminates the user behaviour in particular
HW Characteristics. So,
If c = {mi,mj,mk} and c̄ = {m̄i, m̄j, m̄k}
We assume d = 3− |c
⋂
c̄|, d is the difference between the
two configurations.
And if c and c̄ were same then d = 0
However, if c and c̄ were not same then, d = 3 , which is
(c ∩ c̄) = ∅
5.1.3 Sequential Log-in Context
Uc is set of uses that used C in log-in successfully.
Uc= {l.u|l ∈ S ∧ l.c = c}
|Uc| is total number of using c in successful log-in by same
user.
An important matrices for HW trust is how often c was
used by u among all users of c. This is computed by
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Nu,c = |{l ∈ S|l.u = u ∧ l.c = c}| and is used as relative to
the total numbers of usages of c,Nc
Nc = |{l ∈ S|l.c = c}|
5.2 Illustrative Example
Following analysis example of filtering HAUP factors. Filtering
map in log-in L sequence S which begin by check the “user-
name/password”. Then HAUP checks the c̄ including log-in
time t. Finally the user behaviour b̄ is checked. The result of
this analysis should be related to current users log in attempt
which has four weighted factors Sn =
{
p̄n, c̄n, b̄n, t̄n
}
. Following
procedure declares every filtering target in this example:
When the user log-in to HAUP approach, the log-in factors
is filtered by the username and password which noted by p
factor.
Sp = {l ∈ S|l.p = p}
If the user uses more than one HW during the day/week,
HAUP approach filters the log-in based in HW factor which
is used in current successfully log-in attempt c̄. So, HAUP
explores user pattern if the hardware been used in successful
log-in attempt before. If so, that mean Nc > 1 which three
Chapter 5. Mathematical Model of HAUP 107
main hardware parts information from current hardware are
used before in successful log-in attempt by the same user.
Sc = {l ∈ S|l.c = c}
If the user has particular behaviour at particular time dur-
ing the day/week based on particular hardware, HAUP ap-
proach filters the log-in based in behaviour factor. So, if the
user’s behaviour in current log-in attempt has similarity to
previous user behaviour in using same hardware which means
(bu ∩ b̄n) = tu. In addition, if analysing and capturing the user
behaviour in particular time during the day, that means the
user is using same hardware at particular time. That is
St = {l ∈ S|lt = t}
So, HAUP approach have three factors weight based on
username and password validation factor.
Sp̄n,c̄n,b̄n,t̄n = [0, 1].........(1)
Figure 5.1 shows a sequence of HW usage and how this af-
fects the user’s level of trust. Figure 5.1 shows the first checking
point which is exploring whether the user used the current HW
(c̄u) in previous successful log-in attempts (cu) by find out the
similarity between them. If the HW is used, the HAUP ap-
proach compares the user’s behaviour (b̄u) during the current
successful log-in using current HW configuration from previous
usage bu. So, if user’s behaviour is similar to the user pattern,
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the approach has profiled the user. Furthermore, to recognize
the user, the HW change during the day time should be recog-
nized as part of the profile of user HW.
When the user keeps using particular group of HW the
user will have specific behaviour when every particular HW
is used. This familiarity discriminates the user behaviour in
particular HW, e.g., the user has keystroke pattern in using
particular keyboard. So, recognizing user behaviour in using
specific HW provides profiling for the user during the day/week.
This profiling is support to trust the user when the user has
unique pattern in using particular HW. For example, every
user has particular pattern in using mobile touch screen and
has another pattern in using desktop keyboard.
The HAUP approach merges HW usage, as explained in
Figure 5.1, with biometrics behaviour and log-in times during
the day/week. This yields a HAUP approach in which the
user’s biometrics can be correlated with the HW that is used
during log-in process.
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Figure 5.1: How Using HW Information in Trust User
5.2.1 Lmitations
If a user has successful log-in attempt using particular hardware
then
Sp,c = {l ∈ S|l.p ∧ l.c = c}
If user’s hardware is unknown to be recognized, then the
user is expected to have same behaviour at particular time
during the day which is considered the user is using particular
hardware at same time during the day.
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Sp,c,b = {l ∈ S|l.p ∧ l.c = c ∧ l.b = b}
If user’s hardware and behaviour is unknown to be rec-
ognized with previous user’s pattern at any time during the
day/week, then the user can not be trusted using HW authen-
tication approach.
5.3 Behaviour Trust Based on Hardware In-
formation
User pattern is keystroke behaviours b in typing every single
log-in keys in successfully log-in attempts.
bu = bur1, bur2, bur3........burn
User behaviour in current successfully log-in attempt b̄u is
keystroke behaviour r in typing every single log-in keys.
b̄u = b̄ur1, b̄ur2, b̄ur3........b̄urn
The relation between previous pattern and current user’s
behaviour in r is:
If b̄u in bu We say b̄u ∈ |bu|
If (bu ∩ b̄u) = bu or (bu ∩ b̄u) ≈ bu
We say, bu and b̄u are typical
bu = {l.b|l ∈ Sl.u = u, l.p = up}
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bu∩b̄u =
(∣∣bur1 − b̄ur1∣∣)2 , (∣∣bur2 − b̄ur2∣∣)2 , ..... (∣∣burn − b̄urn∣∣)2




n is number of username and password characters
However, if the user behaviour is related to particular cu,
so profiling user behaviour bu is based on particular cu.
Tα ∩ Tβ = bcu ∩ b̄c̄u
Tβ(l, b) is represented by a neural network for each P and c.
One neural network for each p and c by feeding users behaviour
(keystroke) speed. The typical matching gets higher weight
which is closed to 1 and the completely different matching gets
lower value which is closed to 0.
5.3.1 Back Propagation Algorithm
The important reason for using back-propagation algorithm
was that, it was considered as a supervised learning algorithm
which is used to learn user keystroke pattern. It was used for
multi-layer perceptions to change the respected weights that
were connected with the total hidden neuron layers. This algo-
rithm used the computed output errors to update the weight
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values in backward direction. For retrieving the total error, for-
ward propagation was done earlier. During the forward prop-
agation the neurons would be (activated function) as shown
below:
f(.) = 1/((1 + exp(−X)))
Where:
X - The input.
exp - exponential
The Back Propagation algorithm worked based on the fol-
lowing 4 steps:
1- It performed forward propagation phase with respect to
the input pattern and calculate the error output.
2- Changed all weight values of each weight matrix using
the formula.
Wk+1 = Wk + (Error ×O)
Vk+1 = Vk + (Error ×O)
where :
k is number of iterations.
k + 1 = next iteration.
O - output of the network
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W - Weight for input layer.
Wk+1 weight at k + 1 time
V - Weight for hidden layer.
Vk+1 weight at k + 1 time
3- Repeated step 1
4- This process of algorithm ended once all the out patterns
match their target patterns. This process required a time stamp
to calculate all of measurements in the neural network. this
time is called number of Epoch.
Back propagation procedures
1- Collect error of output neurons: E = O(1 − O)(d − O)
where d is the desired signal (user’s keystrokes behaviour)
2- Changes output layer weight.
Wk+1 = WR + λEO
Vk+1 = VR + λEO
where λ - is learning rate.
3- Calculate (back-propagate) hidden layer error.
Eh = O(1−O)(EWk +E∆wk) where ∆wk is the change of
the weight with respect to time = dwk/dk
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where Eh is the error in hidden layers
4- Change hidden layer weight
Wk+1 = WR + λEX where X: is users response time in
keyboard pressing
Vk+1 = VR + λEO (output for input layer)
where
WR is the response input weight.
VR is the response hidden weight.


























Figure 5.2: neural network procedures and hidden layer.
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This procedure is used in chapter 7 to explore the hardware
influence in profiling user behaviour. This evaluation enhanced
hardware information to be authentication factor for profiling
proposed. So, this value is express user behaviour matching
when the value is closed to 1. In contrast if the value is closed
to zero that is considered user’s pattern and behaviour are not
same.
5.4 Summary
This chapter presented a formal analysis and assumption to
provide HAUP procedure mathematically in section 5.1. This
mathematical model is using the similarity between user’s cur-
rent hardware configuration c̄ and previous configuration that
is used in any previous successful log-in attempts. This is ex-
ploring the intersection between current user behaviour b̄ and
previous user pattern b in log-in keys (username and password
keystrokes) at particular time when the log-in attempt is suc-
cessful. Section 5.2 illustrate the similarity between user’s HW
and behaviour by giving illustrative example using hardware
and user behaviour factors in HAUP mathematical model based
on given weight of trust for HAUP factors. This weight factors
answers the research question Q.3. by combining HW informa-
tion factor weight with traditional “username and password”
in mathematical model to provide authenticate and profile the
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user. After that, section 5.3 provides mathematical modelling
for user behaviour in using particular hardware at particular
time that addressing the research contribution C.3. by provid-
ing a mathematical model for trust. Finally, section 5.3.1 clari-
fies using neural network function to analysis user behaviour
when two different hardware are used by same an different
users.
Equation #1 provides level of trust to authenticate the
user. The level of trust is between zero and one. This level
of trust is closed to one when intersection between user be-
haviour and pattern has more similar factors. In contrast, the
result is closed to zero when similar factors are less.
The following chapter will provide the practical steps of





1. Establish HAUP software requirements.
2. Explain HAUP system interaction.
3. Implementing HAUP.
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This chapter describes the HAUP authentication proto-
type to develop the HAUP approach as MFA based on the
traditional username and password authentication procedure.
Section 6.1 provides a technical HAUP authentication scenario
which is running in traditional user-name and password au-
thentication in the client device. Section 6.2 analyses HAUP
program codes that are running with traditional username and
password to profile users’ hardware and observe user behaviour.
Then, section 6.3 provides HAUP analysis methods to present
the relationship between user behaviour and previous users’
patterns in typing the successful authentication keys using par-
ticular HW. Finally, section 6.4 provides the HAUP analysis
steps in a sequence diagram.
6.1 Hardware Authentication Scenario in Ac-
cess Control
In a HW authentication scenario, the HAUP prototype mon-
itors users’ behaviour in the client device whilst the user is
typing the authentication keys and reads HW information (See
chapter 4.2). This information is sent in an encrypted form by
hash function algorithm [134] with the username and password
information from the user’s device to the server to analyse the
log-in attempt. After that, HAUP checks the authentication
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keys username and passwords and HW information by search-
ing in the HW log-in database to determine if the user used
current HW in any previous successful log-in attempts.
The HAUP prototype collects HW information “HMSPNs”
from user devices. The HAUP prototype assumes some HM-
SPNs but no specific HW parts. User behaviour is monitored
and collected from user devices. HW and user behaviour infor-
mation is used to evaluate the HAUP authentication approach
to show HAUP authentication analysis and compares HAUP
results with current authentication approaches. If a user has
used current HW before, every particular time and user pattern
is observed based on this HW by the HAUP prototype. The
HAUP prototype calculates the similarity between the previous
user’s pattern and current user’s behaviour by using keystroke
profiling. This similarity in the HAUP prototype focuses on
keystroke speed in the authentication keys username and pass-
words. This profiling supports the authentication decision to
give a user a particular level of trust. Figure 6.1 shows the HW
authentication scenario between user’s device and the server.
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3- Network layer.
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Figure 6.1: System Scenario
6.2 System Procedures
With every successful log-in attempt the HAUP prototype cap-
tures user behaviour and collects HW information from the
user’s device. The collected HW information are “MAC ad-
dress, Storage media and BIOS”. Following this the HAUP
prototype analyses the user’s HW information by searching in
the user’s HW database in the server side and explores if the
user has used the current HW parts before. After that, the
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HAUP prototype compares the similarity between the current
user’s behaviour and previous user’s patterns based on using
the same HW. However, if a user’s HW was not determined in
the current log-in attempt the HAUP prototype determines the
log-in time to analyse user patterns in the previous log-in based
on the particular time during the day. This analysis declares
the relationship between the user’s behaviour when the log-in
took place at that particular time. This comparison provides a
particular level of trust for the user.
As result of analysing the HAUP procedures, the HAUP
prototype collects and analyses HW information using the fol-
lowing procedures:
P.1. Profiling the user’s keystroke behaviour when the user-
name and password keys are typed by determine the response
time between key-press and key-release as part of the process
of capturing biometric behaviour (See Section 4.2.2).
P.2. Profiling the user’s HW by reading HMSPNs from the
user’s devices as part of the process of capturing user behaviour
(See Section 4.2.1).
P.3. Collecting the user’s HW and observing user be-
haviour from the client side then sending the encrypted results
to the server side.
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P.4. Analysing the user’s HW in the server side by ex-
ploring how often the user used current HW before user and
recognizing user behaviour (keystrokes speed in typing the log-
in keys) in the user’s device.
P.5. Determining the log-in time that support to recognize
user’s HW that is used and the time of using a particular HW
during the day/week. This time stamp motivates to recognize
user behaviour and refer the user behaviour to particular HW.
To collect HW information the HAUP prototype requires
amending the user operating system by sending and implement-
ing particular file in client device. This file is suitable with
users operating system. A HAUP relationship diagram can
work on any method of physical storage, whether it be disk,
CD or USB as they can all be used for storing data. Figure 6.2
shows general diagram of HAUP authentication procedures, (1)
enrolment, (2) identification and (3) verification. In contrast,
user behaviour implements a particular function to calculate
the time response of the user’s keystroke when entering the
username and password in the log-in form. Both reading HW
and monitoring user behaviour implement a visual analysis to
show user’s behaviour. This analysis shows the level of trust in
the user based on the current HW.
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Figure 6.2: Diagram of HAUP Procedures
6.3 HAUP Analysis
The HAUP authentication technique depends on the matching
of the current HW against the user’s previous HW usage the as-
sociated user’s behaviour against the previous user’s behaviour
as part of the log-in procedure.
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At the client side the log-in prompt performs three data-
collection functions. Firstly the username and passwords are
collected in the traditional way. Secondly, the keystroke be-
haviour of the user is gathered and saved during the typing of
the username and password. Functions like auto-completion
and the ’copy & paste’ functions are turned off, as they would
effectively disable the recognition of the keystroke behaviour.
Thirdly, during log-in, HAUP reads the HW configuration from
the user’s operating system. This requires the user to download
the log-in software or the server address from which the log-in
prompt is loaded.
On the server side the HAUP checks the username and pass-
word hash against the stored credentials. If this is successful,
the additional two components - HW recognizer and keystroke
recognizer - are invoked to further validate the log-in request,
thus providing additional scrutiny. The HW recognizer checks
the database to establish whether the user has used before. If
the user has used before, the system determines the similar-
ity between the current keystroke behaviour and the previous
keystroke pattern.
6.3.1 Sequence Diagram of Behaviour Modelling
Beginning from the early stage of using a particular HW con-
figuration, the HAUP system can ask additional questions for
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verification because of the new and unknown HW. Unknown
HW is an obstacle which hinders the ability to recognize user
behaviour in previous usage. As such, the HAUP system col-
lects HW information and user behaviour for the first time and
use additional verification questions. However, in the next log-
in the system resumes using use HW authentication. Figure
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Figure 6.3: Sequence Diagram of Using HAUP First Time
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The HAUP prototype checks the user HW at every suc-
cessful log-in. In this way the HW can be tracked during sub-
sequent successful log-in attempts. So, the HAUP approach
collects the user’s HW and monitors the user’s behaviour. At
every successful log-in, the server side profiles the user’s HW
and recognizes the user’s behaviour based on the HW infor-
mation. Figure 6.4 shows the sequence diagram of HW usage
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Figure 6.4: Sequence Diagram of using hardware After First Time
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6.4 System Interaction
As previously discussed, when the user types their username
and password in the log-in field, HAUP captures the user’s
behaviour and calculates the response time between each key
press and release of every single keystroke contained within
the username and password to observe the user’s behaviour at
every successful log-in attempt (See Section 6.2). Keystroke
response time is calculated by millisecond in order to observe
user’s pattern however, some programming language can calcu-
late the nanosecond which is faster and can give more details
about keystroke that can improve HAUP approach to recog-
nize user’s keystroke behaviour. Figure 6.5 shows HAUP code
to capture user’s keystrokes.
To implement HAUP authentication prototype a Java pro-
gramming language is type of safe language. This program-
ming language can support different environment application
and consider a virtual machine, platform independence, sup-
port web and network, network applications support with high
performance [135]. However the code access security aims to
evaluate HAUP and was not a consideration for the prototype
demonstration proof of concept. In addition, in real application
the system will consider in system interrupt time in order to
observe user behaviour. This development will be used when
the system uses nanosecond to recognize user behaviour.
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336    AccountUsaerNameText.addKeyListener(new KeyAdapter() { private void keyPressed(KeyEvent e) { 
337              int keyCode = e.getKeyCode();
338              MiliSecondP = System.currentTimeMillis();
339              if (COUNTER1==0) {MiliSecondTotalrhythm= System.currentTimeMillis();
340                                 }
341              KeyStrocked[COUNTER1] =""+e.getKeyChar()+""; 
342              if(COUNTER1!=0){    Res[COUNTER1]= MiliSecondP-MiliScondW;}
343                                   } 
344      private void keyReleased(KeyEvent e) {   
345                                            CurrentLOGINBehaviorInfo[COUNTER1] = System.currentTimeMillis() - MiliSecondP;
346                                      if(""+CurrentLOGINBehaviorInfo[COUNTER1]+""==null)     
347                                              {CurrentLOGINBehaviorInfo[COUNTER1]=0;} 
348                                       MiliScondW = System.currentTimeMillis();
349                                       COUNTER1++;             }           
350      private void keyTyped(KeyEvent e) {       }}); 
351      AccountUsaerNameText.addActionListener( new ActionListener() { private void actionPerformed( ActionEvent e )
352                                                                       {      if (COUNTER1<5)
353                                                                              {JOptionPane.showMessageDialog(frame,"Please type your username"); 
354                                                                              AccountUsaerNameText.setText("");
355                                                                              AccountUsaerNameText.grabFocus(); 
356                                                                              AccountPasswordText.setText("");
357                                                                              COUNTER1=0;}
358                                                                              else {AccountPasswordText.grabFocus(); }
359                                                                               } } );
360     AccountPasswordText.addActionListener( new ActionListener() { private void actionPerformed( ActionEvent e )
361                {           else {LogInButton.grabFocus();
362                             LogInButton.doClick(); }   } } );
363     AccountPasswordText.addKeyListener(new KeyAdapter() { 
364     public void keyPressed(KeyEvent e) { 
365     int keyCode = e.getKeyCode();
366                                                  MiliSecondP = System.currentTimeMillis();
367                                                  KeyStrocked[COUNTER] =""+e.getKeyChar()+"";
368              	                                  KeyStrockedBehaviourSpeed[COUNTER3]=""+e.getKeyChar()+""; 
369              	                                   if(COUNTER2!=16){Res[COUNTER2]= MiliSecondP-MiliScondW;}
370                                                } 
371
372     private void keyReleased(KeyEvent e)
373                                        {   CurrentLOGINBehaviorInfo[COUNTER2] = System.currentTimeMillis() - MiliSecondP;
374                                  if(""+CurrentLOGINBehaviorInfo[COUNTER2]+""==null)    
375                                          {CurrentLOGINBehaviorInfo[COUNTER2]=0; }
376                                    MiliScondW = System.currentTimeMillis();
377                                    COUNTER2++;COUNTER3++;COUNTER++;
378                                                   }           
379            private void keyTyped(KeyEvent e) {  }  }); 
Figure 6.5: Keystroke Biometric Behaviour Capture
The HAUP prototype collects three HW part numbers (MAC
address, Storage media and BIOS) in order to profile the user’s
HW activity. For example, when the HAUP is executed in
the Windows operating system environment a physical MAC
address is given by following the Java code (Figure 6.6).
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28    public String getMacAddress() throws IOException
29   {
30          String macAddress = null;   
31          String command = "ipconfig /all";
32          Process pid = Runtime.getRuntime().exec(command);
33          BufferedReader in = new BufferedReader(new InputStreamReader(pid.getInputStream()));
34          while (true) {
35       String line = in.readLine();
36       if (line == null)      break;
37            Pattern p = Pattern.compile(".*Physical Address.*: (.*)");
38             Matcher m = p.matcher(line);
39        if (m.matches()) {
40        macAddress = m.group(1);
41        break;
42       }
43        }
44       in.close();
45       return macAddress;
46     }
Figure 6.6: “MAC Address” collection from Client HW
The code (Figure 6.6) to collects the user’s HW informa-
tion (physical address or MAC Address) from their device by
obtaining, for example, the motherboard and hard disk drive
manufacturer serial numbers. The complete Java code is avail-
able in appendix (A). However, the collection code is based on
the user operating system such as Windows, iOS and Android.
To recognize the time when a particular HW is used, the
HAUP prototype collects log-in times for every successful log-
in attempt. The system then analyses this information. For
example, the user may use a desktop device whilst at work,
a laptop at home and may use a mobile device whilst on the
move or in public areas.
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To store HW information, the system saves the HW infor-
mation of users in an encrypted database. The store procedure
begins with the first successful log-in using new HW and is
named by the user’s username, as entered at the log-in. Then,
the HAUP prototype saves the user’s HW and behaviour in a
particular table at every subsequent successful log-in. The full
codes is available in appendix (B).
Figure 6.7 shows the user’s HW database which includes
the user’s HW and biometric behaviour [136].
Figure 6.7: HAUP Profiling Database
In HAUP, the database of HW information is considered to
the property of the user as this is a record of the user behaviour
and as such is subject to the user’s privacy rights. Exposure
or leakage of this information would possibly harm the HAUP
integrity. In order to ensure that a user’s privacy is main-
tained and protected, all private information relating to the
user is transferred from the user’s computer to the server in
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an encrypted form using hashing encryption technique. Figure
6.8 demonstrates one example of how encrypted information is
transported for HW by using the manufacturer serial part num-
bers. in addition, HAUP prototype is created to do the set of
exarments which will be improved in the real system that have
to improve the encryption method in order to provide saver
environment for HW and users behaviour information. Further
information about the database architecture is in Appendix
(C).
Figure 6.8: HAUP Encrypted Database
To measure user’s behaviour and patterns the HAUP pro-
totype draws a chart to record the user’s keystroke speed for
a particular HW at every successful log-in. In addition, this
chart shows the average of the user’s keystroke pattern in com-
parison with previous successful log-in attempts and the user’s
keystroke behaviour of the current log-in. Figure 6.9 shows Java
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code which displays user behaviours and pattern. Further in-
formation about full HAUP prototype code for analysing user’s
hardware and behaviour is in Appendix (B).
285   g2.setPaint(Color.green); 
286   for(int j = 0; j < data.length; j++)
287   {  if(data[j]!=0) { int x = x0 + (int)(xScale * (j+1));   
288    int y = y0 - (int)(yScale * data[j]);   
289    g2.fillOval(x-2, y-2, 4, 4); 
290     XPasswordPoint=x;
291     YPasswordPoint=y;}
		            		             }  
Figure 6.9: Plot Measure Code to Show Users Keystroke Behaviour
and Pattern in a HW
6.5 Summary
This chapter described key parts of the HAUP software proto-
type. Section 6.1 provided HAUP technical scenario in access
control to authenticate the user using HW information. Section
6.2 described the main system tasks and requirements of HAUP
including highlighted HAUP procedures including sequence di-
agram of HAUP modelling that answer the research question
Q.6. by addressing the profiling factors in HAUP approach to
authenticate the user. Section 6.3 revealed that this HAUP
prototype is executable in a Windows operating system by us-
ing the Java code to show that HAUP analysed and evaluated
the HAUP approach. Following this, the chapter illustrated
the storing methods to save user’s HW and behaviour. Section
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6.4 presented a method of reading user’s hardware and mon-
itoring user behaviour at every successful log-in attempt and
discussed and analysed safe and effective ways of transferring
user data ensuring user’s privacy was maintained. Finally, this
chapter provides observing function to determine the similar-
ity between user behaviour and pattern every successful log-in
attempt.
The next chapter will provide set of experiments which give
detailed examples of when the HAUP system has been used
followed by an evaluation of these set of experiments.
Chapter 7
Set of Experiments and
Evaluation
Objectives
1. Define evaluation criteria.
2. Determine priority classes.
3. Implementing set of experiments.
4. Presenting evaluation.
134
Chapter 7. Set of Experiments and Evaluation 135
This chapter provides set of experiments using the HAUP
prototype. In these set of experiments, group of users who have
(eight postgraduate students) used IT services before and have
good experience in providing their pattern in typing keyboard
keys .The HAUP prototype illustrates user’s HW and behaviour
in diagram analysis. Then, neural networks are used to observe
the user’s behaviour data to analyse user patterns based on
the particular HW in order to evaluate the HAUP profiling
technique. Section 7.1 determines and describes the evaluation
criteria to assess HAUP. Section 7.2 shows the user’s behaviour
diagram when using a particular HW. This section provides
the HAUP profiling technique to clarify the difference between
HAUP profiling and the current authentication profiling.
Section 7.3 provides the data collected by the HAUP set of
experiments. Section 7.4 discusses the log-in timing behaviour
to support the HAUP analysis of the user’s HW activity which
affects the user’s behaviour when a particular HW is used at
particular time. Section 7.5 addresses the ability of the HW
environment to support the profiling of user behaviour when
the same log-in keys are used.
To analyse user’s behaviour using additional recognizing
techniques, section 7.6 determines the neural network analy-
sis which explores the differentiation between neural networks
analysis and the HAUP prototype to recognize user behaviour.
Then, subsection 7.6.1 clarifies the neural network comparison
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between the user’s behaviour in typing the same authentication
password keys when the same and different HW is used. After
that, subsection 7.6.2 illustrates the neural network analysis
and comparison of users’ behaviours when group of users use
the same HW and password keys, followed by analysing these
user behaviours when another HW are used.
7.1 Proposed Set of Experiments and Eval-
uation Criteria
These set of experiments proposes to apply the HAUP proto-
type as the authentication method with the traditional user-
name and password. Then, following experiments will be ap-
plied to evaluate HAUP approach:
1. In the first experiment, one user who has experience in
IT services, e.g., user who familiar with bank account services.
This user will use two different HW and same authentication
keys ”username-password” in performing access procedure for
two hundred times. This experiment profiling user behaviour
in typing log-in keys using the same HW and shows the HAUP
prototype demonstrates how to recognize user behaviour and
pattern every successful log-in attempt. This experiment aims
to recognize the different on observing user pattern in the two
HW.
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2. In the second experiment, two users use same HW and
same authentication keys ”username-password” for two hun-
dred times by every user. This experiment aims to explore the
different in these users pattern when same HW recognize every
user pattern. This experiment shows the HW performance us-
ing HAUP prototype to observe each user pattern in keystroke
behaviour.
3. In the third experiment, group of users will use two dif-
ferent HW and same authentication keys ”username-password”
for hundred times. This experiment provides HAUP prototype
and neural network techniques to show the different in recog-
nizing user pattern using the to different HW.
So, in a specific identity authentication application when we
are looking for the potential biometric to be used, the following
three criteria must be evaluated [137] to clarify the advantages
and disadvantages of the developed approach:
E.C.1. Acceptability, which indicates that people have ac-
cepted the process of using the HAUP system.
E.C.2. Circumvention, which identifies how it is possible
to circumvent the authentication system.
E.C.3. Performance, which specifies the achievable identi-
fication (verification) accuracy and resources needed to achieve
an acceptable level of accuracy [138, 139].
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7.2 Profiling User Behaviour in Typing Log-
in Keys Using The Same HW
Using particular password keys in the log-in procedure by and
using specific HW can improve recognizing user behaviour in
specific user context environment (See Section 3). In the HAUP
prototype the user’s behaviour is assessed by monitoring the
user’s keystroke speed which is assumed to be between zero and
one thousand milliseconds by determining the time response be-
tween each keystroke and each key release which captures every
username and password key in every successful log-in attempt.
This assumption determines the user pattern domain which
develops the ability to recognize user behaviour and declares
the relationship between user behaviour and real user patterns.
The HAUP prototype learns user’s behaviour by recording ev-
ery keystroke used at every successfully log-in attempt.
In this learning, the HAUP monitors user’s keystrokes. Fur-
thermore, capturing user behaviour with respect to the user’s
HW can build profiling signatures or characteristics for the
user. Figure 7.1 shows input user behaviour in typing pass-
word keys using the same HW and determines particular do-
mains for the user’s keystroke speed. So, the user’s keystrokes
in the username and password keys has particular characteristic
about the user which are based on HW analysis.
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Figure 7.1: User Behaviour in Typing Log-in “Password” Keys by
Using The Same Hardware
User behaviour is recognized by calculating the password
keystrokes’ response time which is the delay time between each
key press and each key release. This password-keystrokes analy-
sis should be limited by the user pattern after the user becomes
familiar with using particular HW. Figure 7.2 shows the user
keystroke speed boundaries after capturing user behaviour in
200 successful log-ins.
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Figure 7.2: User Pattern in Typing “Password” Using The Same Hard-
ware
7.3 Set of Experiments Using HAUP Ap-
proach
The HAUP prototype was designed to record each user’s HW
and behaviour as an implicit identity in the log-in procedure.
When a user inputs the correct username and password the
HAUP prototype collects three HMSPNs. These are date BIOS,
MAC address and the hard disk manufacturer’s serial numbers.
When the user logs in to the system and the HW information
is determined, the HAUP prototype searches in the user’s HW
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database to determine if the user has used the current HW pre-
viously or if this is the first time. If the user has used it before,
HAUP shows the percentage of usage of the current HW from
other user usage the HAUP prototype analyses user behaviour
and provides a level of trust to authenticate the user if the user
has used current HW before.
7.3.1 One User Uses The Same Hardware
In this experiment, the user has had more than four hundred
successful log-in attempts to the HAUP prototype using a par-
ticular computer device’s HW. The HAUP prototype clarifies
the similarity between the current users behaviour and the pre-
vious user’s pattern to explore the trust result and establish if
the user has used the current username and password previ-
ously. Figure 7.3 shows the percentage of HW usage and the
ability to recognize user behaviour in the current successful log-
in attempt. User behaviour is reflected through red dots that
appear in Figure 7.3 and observes if the current user behaviour
in typing the username and password is related to the user
pattern which is reflected through the domain between yellow
dots, as shown in Figure 7.3. This observation declares if the
user behaviour is within the user’s pattern domain or not.
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Figure 7.3: Hardware Usage and Profile Against Keystroke Pattern
In contrast, if the user’s keystroke behaviour has changed
this could possibly indicate a hacker or fraudulent usage which
may have compromised the log-in keys. The HAUP prototype
recognizes the difference between user patterns and behaviour
in typing the username and password keys. Figure 7.4 clarifies
the delay in user’s keystroke response times when the username
and password is typed. So, the HAUP prototype observes the
delay in the user’s current behaviour which is reflected through
red dots that appear in Figure 7.4. Moreover, the total user
behaviour is changing in the user’s keystroke signature and the
HAUP prototype shows the user’s behaviour in keystroke speed
is not similar to the user’s pattern.
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Figure 7.4: Hardware Usage And Profile of The Delay in Keystroke
Behaviour
7.3.2 One User Using Two Different Sets Of Hard-
ware
In this experiment the HAUP prototype improves the ability of
observing the difference in user behaviour when different HW
are used. In this experiment, the user has performed 50 success-
ful log-ins using the same username and password keystrokes as
in the previous log-in procedure. Also in this experiment, the
HAUP prototype observes user behaviour and patterns in the
second computer device is faster than the first computer obser-
vation. Figure 7.5 shows keystroke behaviour and patterns in
the first HW set on the left side. In contrast; the right hand
side of Figure 7.5 indicates the second HW set which has been
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affected by the keystrokes and rhythm of the second HW set
when log-in keys are typed.
Figure 7.5: Hardware Profiling and Recognizing User Behaviour
Against One User Using Two Different Hardware
7.3.3 Two Users Using the Same Password and Hard-
ware
In this experiment, two users used the same HW and same
password for fifty successful log-in attempts. The HAUP pro-
totype recognizes the HW effect by observing user’s keystroke
behaviour. The HAUP prototype compares users based on the
their patterns in using a particular HW. Figure 7.6 show the
HW effect in user behaviour and pattern stamps.
Chapter 7. Set of Experiments and Evaluation 145
Figure 7.6: HW Usage and Profile Against Two Users Use Same Log-in
Information “Password” in One Hardware
7.4 The Relation Between Log-in Time and
Hardware Usage
The log-in time during the day and week could be an addi-
tional factor to support HAUP. This time stamp can clarify
user behaviour and how this changes during the day time. For
example, the user may move between their desktop at their
workplace then use their laptop at home and their smart phone
in between. In this case the user’s pattern is affected by the
user HW context during the day times which appears in the
performance of recognizing user behaviour. In addition, the
time factor recognizes the user HW changing by recording and
monitoring the user HW changing in the previous log-in at-
tempts. For example, if the user used to use a particular HW
from 9:00 am to 04:00 pm every day the system could expect
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to see a specific pattern in the user’s HW by the analysis of the
previous record of the user’s behaviour at these times, even if
the HAUP couldn’t read the user HW. The HAUP system can
read the HAUP prototype and adds the time factor to support
the profiling of changes in the user’s HW. Figure 7.7 show the
number of users using a particular HW at a specific time.
Figure 7.7: Time ”Signature” in Using a Particular Hardware
7.5 Priority Classes Threshold
In the HAUP prototype, the user behaviour calculations are
based on recognizing the user’s HW. For example, if the user
has more than one HW device, i.e. desk-top, mobile and lap-
top, the HAUP system should be aware of the different environ-
ments and the different times these have been used throughout
the day.
In the HAUP authentication, the priority classes are given
a level of trust and the HAUP’s focus is on the valid username
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and password. If valid, the HAUP classifies the user HW to
give the level of trust to the user. If the HW has been used by
the user before; the HAUP further increases the user’s level of
trust. If the user behaviour related to the user has stored the
patterns from the previous usage, the level of trust increases
and the user can get more priority. Moreover, the level of trust
is increased if the user used the HW by his pattern at the same
time during the day/week. However, if one of these factors was
not reliable in relation to previous successful attempts, the level
of trust will decrease because of the system inability to bind
between the user’s pattern and current user behaviour. Thus,
the ability of implementing MFA has the benefit of calculating
the level of trust for the user at every log-in attempt. Priority
classes have contributed to the implementation of the HAUP
approach. Priority classes provide percentage results to trust
the user based on the user’s data in the HW log-in database.
This result clarifies the level of trust by determining the per-
centage of trust and partial trust to provide full success for user
authentication. This percentage begins with the denial of the
service which is zero percentage if the username or password
are not valid. Then the HAUP system gives partial success if
the HAUP approach is accepted with the username and pass-
word validation. However, for the first usage of the new HW
the authentication system may require an additional verifica-
tion question. After that, when the user accepts the HAUP
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approach in the access control, the system includes the user
behaviour and time stamp factors to implement the HAUP au-
thentication approach as the MFA. So, if the user keeps using
the same HW at a particular time and applying the same be-
haviour and patterns so, the HAUP level of trust will increase.
Figure 7.8 shows priority the classes for every log-in procedure
using HAUP factors.
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Figure 7.8: Priority Classes in HAUP Factors
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7.5.1 Overall Level of Trust
Giving percentage measurements for HAUP authentication fac-
tors can represent a particular level of trust for the user. These
factors are collaborated with the username and password au-
thentication approach. In the HAUP prototype a trust level
of 75% is given if a user keeps using the same three HW parts
(BIOS, MAC, HDD) every successful log-in. This weight of
percentage (75%) is summarise of the three parts weight which
are (BIOS=25% , MAC=25% , HDD=25%) that focuses on the
user’s HW as the main factor to profile the user in HAUP. So,
HAUP give 75% for HW information because this value is rep-
resenting main factor in HAUP approach and this factor has
influenced in user behaviour and log-in time. If the user used
same HW, a trust level of 15% is given for the user behaviour
because of the relation between user HW and behaviour that
be supported by user’s HW which been used before. So, user
the behaviour level is increasing to 90% based on the matching
between the user’s patterns and behaviour. After that an ad-
ditional 10% is given if the user has logged-in at the same time
because the time has influenced to recognize user behaviour and
not related user behaviour but can support to recognize user
context during the day. However, these percentages will be
recalculated if some factors has significant and more influence
in comparing with another HAUP factors which can improve
the approach assistant in future work. This time percentage is
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increased when the user continues to log-in at the same partic-
ular time every day or week and may eventually reach up to a
99% of level of trust. As result of analysing these authentica-
tion factors, the HAUP prototype supports the username and
password authentication approach by determining the similar-
ity percentage between the previous and current user’s HAUP
factor. Figure 7.9 illustrates the overall level of trust based on
HAUP prototype factors.
Figure 7.9: Overall Level of Trust
As mentioned in the mathematical model (Chapter 5 sec-
tion 5.1.1) Wα + Wβ = 1, user HW weight to be trusted can
be Tα = .5 if the user used the HW in previous successful log-
in attempts. User behaviour weight can be Wβ = .5 if the
user behaviour is similar to user pattern in previous success-
ful log-in attempts which illustrated by user behaviour weight
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is close to .5. However, if user behaviour weight was close to
zero that means, Wα = .5 and Wβ + Wα = .0. In contrast, if
the user did not user current HW before Wα = 0 which means
Wα +Wβ = 0 the because of HAUP inability to determine user
pattern in new HW. These weight values may have additional
weight factor, e.g., time and can be chnge based on the factor
influence in the level of trust. For example HW weight can be
Wα = .75 and the user behaviour is Wα = .25 when the HW
can has important charstristics to trust the user.
7.6 Neural Network Analysis in Matlab
As been mentioned in Chapter 2, the neural network is used in
profiling user’s behaviour and has specific parameters to evalu-
ate recognition approaches by adaptive learning. The adaptive
learning rate is used to recognize user behaviour. One of ad-
equate techniques to identify user behaviour systems is neural
networks in Mat-lab application. Neural network has just two
random parameters which are learning rate and number of hid-
den layers. These numbers of parameters are less than fuzzy
and genetic parameters. A neural network criterion declares the
difference between the user’s behaviours based on a particular
HW. Some of these criteria are 1) mean square error (MSE)
which the different between the desired signal ”HW” and the
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neural network outputs, 2) Epoch which is time required to
measure all neural network calculation.
When training by minimum error, this represents the max-
imum number of iterations [140]; performance which is mim-
icking human error patterns and measured the behaviour of
the system as minimum or maximum error that calculated by
mean square error. [119]; validation which is a technique for
assessing how the results of a statistical analysis will generalise
to an independent data set [141], and gradient which is a first-
order optimization algorithm to finding a local minimum of a
function using gradient descent, one takes steps proportional
to the negative of the gradient (or of the approximate gradi-
ent) of the function at the current point [142]. These criteria
clarifies HW influences in profiling user behaviour. So, neural
network analysis is used for analysing the HAUP authentica-
tion results. This result determines the user keystroke speed
when typing password keys in two different computers. This
analysis investigates the differences in user keystroke patterns
in every computer environment. This investigation declares the
keystroke speed at every successfully log-in attempt on every
computer.
In HAUP studies, neural network analysis has five hid-
den layers to learn user patterns using fitting techniques [143].
This fitting learning uses a back propagation technique which
is adaptive rate learning, has minimum learning error and has
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two random parameters. These parameters are a number of
hidden layers and learning rates. Furthermore, the HAUP pro-
totype is trying to obtain optimal performance to learn the
user’s behaviour which can determine the user’s pattern in a
particular HW environment. So, this experiment focuses on
learning the user’s keystroke behaviour in a variety of HW to
prove the differentiation in profiling user behaviour when the
HW changed.
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Figure 7.10: Users Keystroke Speed Analysis Using Two Different
Hardware
Figure 7.10 illustrates the user pattern by determining the
user’s keystroke speeds in the user password at every successful
log-in. In this experiment, more than two hundred successful
attempts are monitored using the same password keys using two
different HW. So, the keystroke speed in the first computer is
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spending less time than the keystroke speed in the second com-
puter. In addition, every keystroke key has a specific average
speed in every computer HW.
7.6.1 Using Neural Network to Compare Between Users
Behaviour When Two different HW are Used
In this experiment neural network recognition is used to learn
the user’s behaviour when two different HW and the same pass-
word keys are used for more than two hundred successful log-in
attempts. In these successful log-in attempts, the user entered
the password as the required key log to be granted authorisa-
tion.
Figure 7.11 shows neural network training to learn two
user’s patterns. On the above side the first user required 6
epochs to reach the maximum number of errors to learn the
user pattern and the best validation performance was 3.7856e-
011. However, the second user on the bottom of figure 7.11 has
a validation performance of.00023138 which is the best valida-
tion performance and needed 11 epochs to be recognized.
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Figure 7.11: Neural Network Training Performance From Two Users
Patterns Using the Same Hardware
In order to form a comparison between the HAUP and
neural network Analysis the keystroke behaviour of each user
has been collected and the users behaviour has been compared
based on both users using the same HW and password keys.
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Both users have at least fifty successful attempts during the
log-in procedure.
The result of analysing the users keystroke patterns and
behaviour in the successful log-in is obtained by monitoring
the users keystroke speed signature as a sample of recognizing
the users behaviour, based on a particular HW. In addition, the
neural network provides a specific fitting for each user which is
indicated through second column in Figure 7.12.
Figure 7.12 presents the users behaviour and pattern anal-
ysis when using the same HW. This experiment shows the HW
influence in recognizing user behaviour, even when the same
username and password were used.
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No User  
Name 
Password Hardware environment is MAC: 00-1C-C0-6D-6E-AA, Storage media:  -128640614 motherboard:  
BQJO8280076R for 50 successfully log in attempts by 12 users 
HAUP system analysis Neural network analysis 
1 hosam password 
     
2 4400773 password 
    
3 P0800238x password 
    
4 abdul password 
    
5 abdulgader password 
    
6 asd password 
    
7 jadi password 
    
8 salamro password 
    
9 snooh password 
     
10 ssomdah password 
     
11 username password 
    
12 yusefalzahrani password 
     
 
Figure 7.12: Analysis of User Behaviour When Using the HAUP Pro-
totype and Neural Network With Respect to a Particular Hardware
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The comparison in Figure 7.13 illustrates the HAUP pro-
cess of recognizing and demonstrating the differentiation in ob-
serving user keystrokes when using different HW and how this
may affect the monitoring of user behaviour. In this experi-
ment, every users behaviour was monitored during 50 success-
ful log-ins when using the same username and password. Then
HAUP system extracts the user patterns based on the HW fac-
tor. User patterns are reflected in the figures displayed in the
fourth and fifth columns of Figure 7.13. These figures clarify
the user patterns in the two HW contexts, using the HAUP
prototype.
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No User  
Name 
Password Hardware environments 
00-1C-C0-6D-6E-AA, -128640614 and 
BQJO8280076R 
00-21-5D-13-F5-9A, -998986574 and 
CNF8375GR0 
1 hosam password 
  
2 4400773 password 
  
3 P0800238x password 
  
4 abdul password 
  
5 abdulgader Password 
  
6 asd password 
  
7 jadi password 
  
8 salamro password 
  
9 snooh password 
  
10 ssomdah password 
  
11 username password 
  
12 yusefalzahrani password 
  
 
Figure 7.13: Comparison Between Users Keystroke Analysis When Us-
ing Two Different HW Devices and The Same Password Authentication
Keys
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7.6.2 Neural Network Analysis Experiment For Group
of Users
To observe the difference between users patterns using the same
HW the neural network was used. In order to determine the
user patterns and then compare them against the neural net-
work recognition, group of user’s keystroke samples were used
which were the number of users who used the traditional user-
name and password authentication approach. The username
was chosen by the user and the password word was set at pass-
word. Then, following 50 successful log-in attempts on a par-
ticular HW device, the user pattern is then been learned. The
neural network analyses data from eight key samples which are
the keystroke behaviour of typing the password keys using the
same computer device. Then, 15% of the validation and test-
ing mechanisms are considered which build the training of a set
of independent measurements which is the overall percentage
of recognition of the user pattern based the on neural network
back probation. 15% of this recognition is determined because
of the similarity in user behaviour when using two different HW
devices that require a high level of recognition to recognize the
users behaviour. So, neural network training is based on a
minimum error percentage of 30% to learn the users pattern.
The optimal recognition assumed in the case was by 50
inputs and 50 outputs. In addition, applied neural network
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layers in two experiments aim to show how the HW influences
the process of recognizing user pattern in more than one neural
network learning. However, the aim of using neural network
analysis in HAUP set of experiments is not to explore the op-
timal recognition process in order to learn the user pattern.
The aim is to highlight the differences when observing user be-
haviour when using HW factors and how this changes when
observing how the HW influences the neural network learn-
ing. The successful log-in attempts observes the differences in
user behaviour when different HW devices are used which is
be shown in Figure 7.14 below. However, the neural network
calculated the response time consume by millisecond to learn
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Table 7.1: Users Pattern Analysis by Neural Network When Same password Keys and twoHW are Used 3
layers
# User name HW Epoch Time Millisecond Min Error Performance Gradient Mu Validation
1 b(4400773) 1 11 00:00:01 .769 .283 8.07e-05 1.00e-07 6
b(4400773) 2 8 00:00:00 .428 5.03e-05 1.14e-06 1.00e-11 6
2 b(abdul) 1 8 00:00:00 .39 1.61e-24 1.63e-13 1.00e-11 0
b(abdul) 2 14 00:00:00 .801 .0253 .000468 .000100 6
3 b(abdulgader) 1 8 00:00:00 .475 .000174 1.45e-06 1.00e-11 6
b(abdulgader) 2 1000 00:00:14 .622 .0147 3.12e-10 1.00e-09 0
4 b(asd) 1 8 00:00:00 .473 .2.80e-12 7.62e-12 1.00e+11 1
b(asd) 2 5 00:00:00 .342 8.83e-15 2.93e-15 1.00e+08 6
5 b(hosam) 1 59 00:00:01 .694 .0147 1.10e-10 1.00e-10 0
b(hosam) 2 45 00:00:00 .763 4.44e-17 9.94e-11 1.00e-13 0
6 b(jadi) 1 6 00:00:00 .253 7.01e-28 2.65e-16 1.00e-09 0
b(jadi) 2 11 00:00:00 .383 .0269 .00353 .000100 6
7 b(P0800238x) 1 19 00:00:00 .617 1.81e-18 8.90e-11 1.00e-14 0
b(P0800238x) 2 18 00:00:00 .248 3.72e-19 1.38e-14 1.00e-14 0
8 b(ssomdah) 1 134 00:00:02 .354 7.49e-18 9.91e-11 1.00e-13 0
b(ssomdah) 2 10 00:00:00 .431 .0184 8.03e-05 1.00e-07 6
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As a result of using neural network fitting, Tables 7.1 and
shows the difference in neural network factors when neural net-
works learn the user patterns using three layers.
Tables 7.2 and shows the difference in neural network fac-



















Table 7.2: User Pattern Analysis by Neural Network When the Same PW Keys and two HW are Used 5 layers
# User name HW Epoch Time Millisecond Min Error Performance Gradient Mu Validation
1 b(4400773) 1 18 00:00:00 .4751 3.1803e-01 8.041e-06 1.00e-14 0
b(4400773) 2 8 00:00:01 .9798 .12492 6.659e-06 1.00e-11 0
2 b(abdul) 1 8 00:00:00 .669 .0450 1.83e-05 1.00e06 6
b(abdul) 2 14 00:00:00 .654 .0291 .000302 .000100 6
3 b(abdulgader) 1 13 00:00:00 .756 .0148 2.98e-17 1.00e-09 4
b(abdulgader) 2 21 00:00:00 .346 .0147 3.91e-11 1.00e-11 4
4 b(asd) 1 143 00:00:02 .362 .0147 1.82e-10 1.00e+10 0
b(asd) 2 16 00:00:00 .427 4.09e-05 7.62e-06 1.00e+11 6
5 b(hosam) 1 4 00:00:00 .928 3.52e-27 3.93e-15 1.00e-15 0
b(hosam) 2 5 00:00:00 .831 1.71e-30 5.22e-17 1.00e-08 0
6 b(jadi) 1 6 00:00:00 .467 4.24e-05 2.64e-16 1.00e-09 4
b(jadi) 2 9 00:00:00 .468 .00888 .00314 1.00e-09 6
7 b(P0800238x) 1 9 00:00:01 1.11 4.79e-31 2.04e-17 1.00e-12 0
b(P0800238x) 2 16 00:00:00 .367 .0147 5.94e-11 1.00e-14 3
8 b(salamro) 1 12 00:00:00 .526 .0227 2.12e-07 1.00e-06 6
b(salamro) 2 9 00:00:00 .562 6.06e-32 2.00e-17 1.00e-12 6
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From the neural network analysis in Tables 7.1 and 7.2 we
note the user (bssomdah,password) has a different attitude or pat-
tern (mean squared error, epoch and gradient) that emerges
from the neural network when the HW is changed. The gra-
dient result is changing in both tables for every user when the
HW environment changes. For example, the first user b(4400773)
in the Table 7.2 has 41 epoch in the first HW analysis, in con-
trast the epoch value was 2 in the second HW. In addition, user
minimum error, performance, gradient and momentum learn-
ing rate have different analysis results which clarifies the HW
influence in recognizing users pattern.
Furthermore, the neural network analysis and recognition
have different results to those of discrimination that appear in
the previous tables. This result corroborates the theory that
the users computer HW environment provide boundaries that
has an efficient capacity to measure any discrimination when
analysing user behaviour.
Table 7.3 shows the users behaviour by using neural net-
work criteria without profiling a particular computer HW which
is present in another neural network analysis to learn the users
pattern. This result insists the users context value in profiling
user behaviour. Moreover, using keystroke patterns to analyse
user behaviour can be supported by further behaviour analy-
sis. For example, we can include the users keystroke rhythm
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and mouse signature which provides more opportunity to anal-
yse the users behaviour accurately with respect to a particular
HW.
Table 7.3: Analysis of User Patterns Using Neural Networks Without
Determining the Users Hardware and Using Three Layers
# User name Epoch Time ms Min Err Performance Gradient Mu Val
1 b(4400773) 10 00:00:00 .843 .0118 .00200 .100 6
2 b(abdul) 113 00:00:02 .500 .00714 9.93e-11 1.00e-10 0
3 b(abdulgader) 26 00:00:01 .741 .00714 4.32e-11 1.00e-12 0
4 b(asd) 8 00:00:00 .621 .0132 .0129 .00100 6
5 b(hosam) 7 00:00:00 .403 .0179 .000658 1.00e-05 6
6 b(jadi) 9 00:00:00 1.09 .0133 .0132 .100 6
7 b(P0800238x) 32 00:00:00 .454 .00714 9.93e-12 1.00e-12 0
8 b(ssomdah) 13 00:00:00 .258 6.24e-20 9.26e-11 1.00e-14 0
Additional experiment provides additional prove to explore
HW influence in recognizing user behaviour by determining the
similarity in profiling the user when particular HW is used. In
this experiment neural network is doing training for the input
data in two different HW using one hidden layer and three neu-
rones. In this experiment, the neural network is learning user
pattern when ”password” keys are typed for forty five successful
log-in attempts using the two different HW. User ”password”
keystrokes are interred to the neural network and the target are
two categories which are user pattern in every (HW1, HW2).
As result of neural network separate users pattern in two cate-
gories. First category is the user pattern in using first HW and
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the second category for the second. Figure 7.15 show the input
and output steps of the neural network to train user pattern



















User pattern in HW2 
User pattern in HW1 
HW2 HW1 
Figure 7.15: Neural Network Analysis Two Hardware Recognizing user
Patterns
When network learn user pattern in particular HW the next
experiment is testing the neural network by typing new log-in
attempt to show the HW influence in profiling the user. In
this testing the user inputs new data ”password keystrokes”
and the output is neural network determining which HW been
used. Figure 7.16 shows the input and output steps of the
neural network test to determine user HW that been used in
the tested data.










User pattern in HW 
Figure 7.16: Neural Network recognizes which Hardware is Used
The neural network function that learn user pattern and
then test user behaviour using ten-fold cross validation [144]
is available in appendix (D). This function recognize user pat-
tern from the key strokes of forty five successful log-in attempt
using the two HW and using another five attempt to test the
user behaviour and bind between user behaviour and pattern
based on particular HW. For example, when the user types the
”password ” keys using the first PC1 so the result of recognizing
which PC been used should give PC1 high test value (PC1=.7
and PC2= .3). In this experiment the tested data is coming
from HW1 Figure 7.17 shows neural network analysis when the
user b(4400773) pattern is learned tested.
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Figure 7.17: User 4400773 Recognizing And Testing
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Figure 7.18 shows another user analysis result. In this ex-
periment neural network analysis provides two invalid test re-
sult (third and forth test). However the rest of the result prove
the user pattern is related to the valid pattern in the correct
HW.
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Figure 7.18: User abdull Recognizing And Testing
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Table 7.4 shews the result of recognizing user behaviour and
provide the best performance to classify user pattern based on
particular HW. Then, the group of users testing result is pro-
videded after learning user behaviour for ten time. The testing
result in the table is showing the percentage of correction cases
after ten time learning attempts.
Table 7.4: Analysing And Testing Users Pattern Using Neural Network
# User name Worst Performance Best Performance Average Test
1 b(4400773) 0.236 0.008 0.107 80%
2 b(abdul) 0.2690 0.1706 0.2247 80%
3 b(abdulgader) 0.2721 5.2885e-008 0.1316 90%
4 b(asd) 0.2872 0.2178 0.2495 60%
5 b(hosam) 0.2539 0.0962 0.1857 80%
6 b(jadi) 0.4536 0.1496 0.2268 70%
7 b(P0800238x) 0.3329 0.0769 0.2152 70%
8 b(ssomdah) 0.4506 0.1783 0.2390 80%
7.7 Summary
HW observation has affected the profiling of user behaviour
biometrics based on success criteria 7.1. This influence comes
as a result of changing the users computer HW context that
clarified in section 7.2. The HAUP observation has developed
user profiling based on recognizing the users HW context and
log-in time which demonstrated in section 7.4. This HAUP
result clarifies the familiarity of using a particular computer’s
Chapter 7. Set of Experiments and Evaluation 175
HW. In addition, the HAUP technique profiles users behaviour
based on recognizing a particular. Finally, section 7.6 clarified
that profiling users HW has significant characteristics about
a users identity to support user authentication in the access
control threshold that.
From the previous set of experiments is noted the HW in-
fluence in profiling user behaviour, e,g, user’s performance in
the first and second tables 7.1 and shows different analysis to
train users behaviour when the users use different HW.
HW information has significant factors to profile the user
and by comparing this with current authentication approach,
this work has three main criteria which is used to improve nor-
mal trust methods. Firstly, current authentication and profiling
techniques depend on system delay to capture user behaviour;
however the HAUP method captures user behaviour in an ac-
cess control threshold which is stored before moving into the
system services. Secondly, observing user behaviour should be
affected by the user environment HW. So, using behaviour bio-
metrics may not determine user behaviour if the user environ-
ment was not recognized. Thirdly, there is a low cost associ-
ated with the implementation of MFA which the HAUP the
prototype does not need as it does not require any additional
accessories to carry out the multi-authentication approach.
The next chapter summaries this research and provides the
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conclusion. It also explains the main results and achievements
of using HW information as the token key in the MFA ap-
proach. The next chapter also discusses the main requirements
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This chapter provides the conclusion to this research work
by presenting the main achievements and contributions and
highlighting the limitations experienced and discussing future
work. Section 8.1 highlights the achievements of this work and
provides a contribution approach in authentication to support
the authentication in access control. Section 8.2 addresses au-
thentication development when hardware devices profile the
user to discuss the contribution to the authentication in access
control. Section 8.3 provides a review of the success criteria
of the HAUP approach, followed by the main limitations of
this approach in Section 8.4. Finally, section 8.5 confers the
potential for further development.
8.1 Achievements
This research clarified some of the limitations and difficulties
in current authentication factors and approaches in chapter 2.
This research explored HW information availability and user’s
behaviour to provide an authentication approach based on this
available information. This research described HW information
and provided a brief history of HW usage in security proposes.
So, this research analysed authentication HW information to
explore profiling physical behaviour based on particular com-
puter HW and carried out an analysis and design-activities to
model the HW authentication system.
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This research provided a framework in Chapter 3 to use
HW information in profiling user behaviour. Chapter 6 dis-
cussed HAUP prototype implementation which is using profil-
ing techniques to present a trust-model that takes into account
users HW information and behaviour when the ”username and
password” keys are typed. The HAUP prototype is of course
a proof of concept that shows that the techniques can be com-
bined and that their combination yields a positive influence on
the accuracy of the detection. This research provided a java-
based prototype implementation of the HAUP authentication
system and presented a set of experiments as a proof of concept
for this work.
This research presented the HAUP profiling technique in a
prototype system. This research evaluated the HAUP approach
by comparing HAUP with MFA approaches. Then, Chapter 7
focused on the user’s manufacturer serial part numbers as the
user environment to provide a high level of confidence in profil-
ing a user at the access control threshold. This authentication
approach is evaluated by implementing the HAUP prototype to
get simple results and compared the HAUP result with the neu-
ral network analysis to recognize user behaviour and patterns
in a particular computer HW.
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8.2 Contribution
To answer the research questions Q.1 and Q.2, an automated
MFA HW and biometric behaviour authentication system has
been built and tested based on the framework throughout the
research in Chapters 6 and 7. This MFA authentication is
the HAUP prototype which is the subject of this work, the
objective of which was to investigate the integration of the
HW signature with user behaviour. The results of this analysis
are answer questions Q.3 and Q.4 and gives a detailed break-
down of the methodology of the HW approach in Chapters 3
and 4. This approach achieved a better performance that may
not have been achievable with single biometric behaviour alone
such as, for example, keystroke, and also improves the tradi-
tional username and password authentication approach with
less cost. These assessments provide the answers to question
Q.5 by evaluating the HAUP approach in Chapter 7 and math-
ematical model in chapter 5.
The experimental investigations, which combined the fea-
ture level and decision level fusions, have improved the final au-
thentication performance. This is addressed in question Q.7 by
evaluating the HAUP approach. Therefore, it has been shown
that the proposed hybrid approach offers considerable improve-
ments to the accuracy of authentication approaches.
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As result of analysing and evaluating this work, HW infor-
mation has significant factors to profile the user and by com-
paring this with current authentication approach, this work has
three main criteria which is used to improve normal trust meth-
ods. Firstly, current authentication and profiling techniques
depend on system delay to capture user behaviour; however
the HAUP method captures user behaviour in an access con-
trol threshold which is stored before moving into the system
services. Secondly, observing user behaviour should be affected
by the user environment HW. So, using behaviour biometrics
may not determine user behaviour if the user environment was
not recognized. Thirdly, there is a low cost associated with the
implementation of MFA which the HAUP the prototype does
not need as it does not require any additional accessories to
carry out the multi factor authentication approach.
This work has improved the username and password au-
thentication technique and reduce potential fraud by strength-
ening authentication based on HW authentication. This work
has identified the new HW authentication approach in demon-
strating that HAUP uses HW manufacturer serial part numbers
in MFA form. This work developed authentication methods to
enforce available and low-cost resources in order to implement
the MFA approach.
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The development of this system has improved profiling tech-
niques using the HW information configuration as authentica-
tion keys in technology services as first step to profile the user in
the HAUP approach. As a result, the traditional username and
password authentication approach can be improved to protect
the user from potential identity fraud.
The proposed solution is a type of authentication for ac-
cess to computer services which is presented in the HAUP ap-
proach. The HAUP approach can discover a user’s behaviour
when an illegal access occurs. This is possible with any account
when the username and password is used by the hacker. This
solution can map the Internet network, even if the total num-
ber of HW information reaches into millions and more. This
approach combines the password based authentication process
with HW profiling and keystroke recognition that then provides
an MFA scheme which does not require additional devices to
be deployed. In addition, the HAUP approach adds little cost
to the deployment authentication approach.
8.3 Success Criteria Revisited
To answer the research questions that we pointed out in Chap-
ter 1, framework for Hardware Authentication and User Pro-
filing has been provided then implemented in prototype and
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evaluated throughout the thesis as following:
S.C.R.1. To answer research questions Q.1. Q.2. back-
ground about authentication in access control field is covered
in Chapter 2. Then, some limitations and difficulties in current
authentication approaches are highlighted.
S.C.R.2. To answer research questions Q.3. and Q.4.,
methodology of proposed framework and system architecture
are shown and anglicised in Chapters 3 and 4.
S.C.R.3. To answer the research question Q.5., we imple-
mented HW investigation with user behaviour prototype upon
traditional authentication username and password approach in
Chapter 6.
S.C.R.4. To answer Q.5. Q.6. and Q.7, we provided set
of experiments to evaluate the advantages of integrating HW
authentication approach in traditional username and password
approach. Then, comparison between HW and current authen-
tication factors is presented and evaluated using neural network
in Chapter 7.
8.4 Limitations
Implementing this work requires the user’s HW information
which can be very difficult to collect from the user’s devices
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because of the variety of user’s operating in the system envi-
ronment and due to client privacy issues. In addition, during
the research steps, the time taken to collect information about
the user’s data could not provide more HW information. How-
ever with more time, more comprehensive analysis could be
undertaken. Furthermore, analysing user behaviour requires
more components and real user patterns at every successful
log-in attempt to observe user behaviour in keystroke typing
behaviour.
There are also extensions factors which may affect user be-
haviour. For example, HW performance may have different
values to recognize user patterns. However, HAUP approach
factors has a significant influence to recognize user behaviour
and the development of the HAUP approach can include user
HW performance in the level of trust.
8.4.1 Ways in which the solution might fail
This work shown that, the availability of the HW informa-
tion configuration on its own could enhance security and trust.
However the work presented in this research show that by cap-
turing a wide range of HW information is possible to perform
an analysis of behaviour characteristics. The prototype soft-
ware has shown the level of trust that can be declared from
HW information usage. So, the proposed solution might not
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work if approach is not able to get the HW information of the
user that requires a specific technique or procedure to get a
HMSPNs. Furthermore, reading specific HW configuration ad-
dress procedure may break privacy laws.
8.5 Future Work
In the future development of this research the profiling tech-
niques used will be refined in the HAUP framework and the
possibility of implementing techniques based on support vector
machines will also be explored.
This research also will also investigate the use of the pro-
file information in attack attribution, as the HW profiles can
provide an indication about fraudulent users. In addition, this
research will look at geo-spatial information and its integra-
tion in the HW recognizer. The idea is that successive log-ins
from different geographical areas are not plausible and can in-
dicate fraudulent activity. In this line of investigation future
work will also actively deploy honey-pots to further identify be-
havioural traits of the user. This information can then be used
twofold, a) to provide additional attribution information about
the attacker, and b) to retrospectively authorise the actions
performed if the user is deemed to be genuine. In addition, the
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following future work can develop HAUP approach as future
possibilities:
FW1 - by sorting more HW information and determining
a black list for example, switch and router HW information,
the system determines the spoofed HW information by creat-
ing HW taxonomy for user’s hardware that improve the secu-
rity in authentication. In addition, the system will check the
clients’ HW information to authenticate the user. This level of
information can be supported to protect users inside a network
from the outside and protect any public websites. These public
websites provides wide usage that will eventually evaluate this
work.
FW2 - to use additional behavioural recognition approaches,
e.g., fuzzy language, to find more definition for any user be-
haviour. In addition, using a Support Vector Machine to hold
opposing views between user behaviour that is part of the user
pattern and explore hacker’s behaviours, as shown in Figure 8.1
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Figure 8.1: Support Vector Machine recognizer
FW3 - to extending the username and password authen-
tication keys to long text will provide more opportunities to
observe user behaviour as opposed to shorthand. So the HAUP
system can recognize user behaviour at the point of log-in.
Furthermore, if we refine the individual techniques and adopt,
for example, keystroke recognition approaches so as those that
have been presented in [73] , this can also improve the ability
of recognizing user patterns.
FW4 - to implement the HW approach as an authenti-
cation protocol in a network low-level layer which is required
as an additional procedure through the network. For exam-
ple, the system should determine how many hardware parts
are mandatory to reflect user behaviour. The system should
determine whether this hardware and user behaviour informa-
tion will be carried and transferred in the header of each packet.
The encryption store and save method of hardware information
Chapter 8. Conclusion 188
should be secure. The HAUP approach can develop the HW
authentication technique to be used as authentication protocol.
FW5 - to use hardware information in forensics by neural
network analysis which is capable of solving problems related
to patterns by using several techniques such as clustering, clas-
sification and generalising. They are also able to predict future
events on the basis of events that have occurred in the past
[145, 146]. These abilities may be useful for forensics where
they can be used to collect evidence after a crime has been
committed; e.g., HW information. Classification is used to dis-
tinguish between two items based on the degree of similarity
between them, such as the distinction between legal and illegal
transactions. Therefore, classification is a helpful algorithm for
investigators as this will enable them to determine illegal ac-
tivities that have been conducted within the system [147]. In
addition, clustering is used to group data in accordance with
resemblances among aspects and characteristics, e.g., matching
a group of users who have used similar HW or a group of users
which share similarities behaviour [124]. Thus, clustering may
have benefits for analysts who wish to group similar unautho-
rised techniques on a particular system or systems. Grouping
crimes in this way makes it easier to deal with a new attack
which is similar to earlier ones, because these have been inves-
tigated and analysed.
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Appendices
A. Collecting HW information code.
B. Full HAUP code.
C. Data base architecture.




Collecting hardware information code
1. Collecting Media Access Control serial
number.
2. Collecting Motherboard serial number.
3. Collecting Hard disk serial number.
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public class GetMac extends JApplet
public static void main(String[] args)
throws IOException
public String getMacAddress() throws IOException
//1. Collecting Media Access Control serial num-
ber
String macAddress = null; //String NodeType = null;
String command = ”ipconfig /all”;
Process pid = Runtime.getRuntime().exec(command);




String line = in.readLine();
if (line == null)
break;
Pattern p = Pattern.compile(”.*Physical Address.*: (.*)”);






public static String getMotherboardSN()
String result = ””;
//2. Collecting Motherboard serial number
try
File file = File.createTempFile(”realhowto”,”.vbs”);
file.deleteOnExit();
FileWriter fw = new java.io.FileWriter(file);
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String vbs =
”Set objWMIService = GetObject(”winmgmts:.root cimv2”)”
+”Set colItems = objWMIService.ExecQuery”
+”(”Select ∗ from Win32BaseBoard”)”
+ ”For Each objItem in colItems n”
+ ” Wscript.Echo objItem.SerialNumber ”




Process p = Runtime.getRuntime().exec(”cscript //NoL-
ogo ” + file.getPath());
BufferedReader input = new BufferedReader (new Input-
StreamReader(p.getInputStream()));
String line;
while ((line = input.readLine()) != null)






public static String getSerialNumber(String drive)
String result = ””;
3. Collecting Hard disk serial number
try
File file = File.createTempFile(”realhowto”,”.vbs”);
file.deleteOnExit();
FileWriter fw = new java.io.FileWriter(file);
String vbs = ”Set objFSO = CreateObject( ”Scripting.FileSystemObject
”)”
+”Set colDrives = objFSO.Drives ”
+”Set objDrive = colDrives.item( ”” + drive + ” ”)”
+”Wscript.Echo objDrive.SerialNumber”; // see note
fw.write(vbs);
fw.close();
Process p = Runtime.getRuntime().exec(”cscript //NoL-














1. Username and password checker code.
2- Observing User hardware.
3. Observing user keystroke behaviour code.
4. Recognising user pattern and behaviour
code.
5. Presenting User hardware and behaviour
code.
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The attached CD includes the HAUP code and Java files.
These files contain the main classes to be run in the server and
user’s machine. Some of these class are to collect the hardware
information (See appendix (A)) and another class to analyse
user hardware and behaviour. Following list are the Java classes
including the aim of each class:
1- PhDprogressservicesLog: This java class is implemented
in users computer to perform the log-in procedure. This file
check the username and password validity, read user hardware
and observe user behaviour in typing username-password keys.
Inaddition, This file analyse user hardware and behaviour to
recognise the relationships between previous and current user
hardware. This file analyse user behaviour based on the hard-
ware usage.
2- GetMac: this java class is reading users hardware infor-
mation( MAC address, HDD, BIOS)
3- KeystrokeTest: This java file represents user behaviour
in graph to show user behaviour.
4- LoginTimePlot: This java file represents how often user
log-in time is during the hours day.
5- LogInDB: This file check the username and password
validity.
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6- PasswordBehaviour: This file represents user behaviour
in typing the password keys.
7- PlotTest: this file show the domain of user pattern when
username and password are typed. In addition, this file shows
user behaviour in current successful log-in attempt.
8- SaveInDB: this file have the saving procedure to save
user hardware and behaviour every successful log-in attempt.
9- OverAllTrustFram: This file represents the overall level




1. Log-in file “ClientsLogFile”.
2- Log file including Users hardware infor-
mation “ClientHWAddresses”.
3. User behaviour tables based on hard-
ware for analysis, e.g., “abdulgader-00-1C-C0-
6D-6E-AA-128640614-BQJO8280076R”.
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HAUP prototype database is built by Microsoft Access.
This database contain three types of tables to authenticate and
profile the user. Firstly, ”ClientsLogFile” table will check if the
username and password are valid or not. If valid the second
table “ClientHWAddresses” checks if the user have used the








5 – MAC Hardware  
6 – BIOS Hardware  

















1- Keystroke behaviour (key1-keyn) 
2- Log-in Time 
 
UserName1 Hardware_2 
 1- Keystroke behaviour (key1-keyn) 
2- Log-in Time 
 
UserName1 Hardware_3 
1- Keystroke behaviour (key1-keyn) 
2- Log-in Time 
 
UserName1 Hardware_n 
 1- Keystroke behaviour (key1-keyn) 
2- Log-in Time 
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If the user used current hardware before then the system
will analyse user hardware and behaviour form the available
data, e.g., “abdulgader-00-1C-C0-6D-6E-AA-128640614-BQJO8280076R”.
However if the user is using new hardware then the system will
build new table for new hardware and behaviour. These tables
are:
1. Log-in table “ClientsLogFile”.
In this table ”ClientsLogFile” the system checks the user
name and password validity. This table will contain the follow-
ing fields:
The Log-in table has the main log-in information. For ex-
ample, following figure show the user log information.
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2- Log file including Users HW information “ClientHWAd-
dresses”.
This table is the main table for HAUP information. This
table contains user’s HW and behaviour.
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Following tables shows example of data when is stored in
(ClientHWAddresses) table.
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3. User behaviour tables based on hardware for analysis,
e.g., “abdulgader-00-1C-C0-6D-6E-AA-128640614-BQJO8280076R”.
This table stores users behaviour in particular hardware by
naming the table by users username and HW information. Fol-
lowing figure shows the data fields to contain user’s keystroke
behaviour.
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Neural Network Function to Test User
behaviour
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function [ ] = runClassifier( input, target)    %extract test data 
    testInd = getTestIndex( target ); 
    testInput = input([testInd],:); 
    testTarget = target([testInd],:);      %the remaining will be training data 
    trainingInd = setdiff([1:size(target)], testInd); 
    input = input(trainingInd, :); 
    target = target(trainingInd, :); 
     
    hiddenLayersSize =[1]; 
    cvMatrix = getCrossValidationMatrix(target); 
     
    for cv=1:10 
        validationSetInd = cvMatrix(cv,:); 
        trainingSetInd = setdiff(1:length(target), cvMatrix(cv,:)); 
         
        net = feedforwardnet(hiddenLayersSize); 
        net.inputs{1}.processFcns = {'removeconstantrows', 'mapminmax'}; 
        net.outputs{2}.processFcns = {'removeconstantrows'}; 
        net.divideFcn = 'divideint'; 
        net.divideMode = 'sample';  % Divide up every sample 
        net.divideParam.trainRatio = 90/100; 
        net.divideParam.valRatio = 10/100; 
        net.divideParam.testRatio = 0/100; 
        net.trainFcn = 'trainrp'; 
        net.performFcn = 'mse'; 
        net.layers{1}.transferFcn = 'tansig'; %for hidden layer 
        %'logsig',softmax', 'tansig'; 
        net.layers{2}.transferFcn = 'softmax'; %for output layer 
         
        net.trainParam.showWindow = false; 
        %net.trainParam.showCommandLine = true; 
  
        [net,tr] = train(net,input(trainingSetInd,:)',target(trainingSetInd,:)'); 
         
        output = net(input(validationSetInd(find(validationSetInd ~= 0)),:)');  
        performance = perform(net,target(validationSetInd(find(validationSetInd ~= 0)),:)',output); 
        %performance=1; 
  
        if(cv == 1) 
           cvPerformance.worst=performance; 
           cvPerformance.best=performance; 
           cvPerformance.average=performance;  
            
            network=net; 
            trainingRecord=tr; 
        else 
            if(performance > cvPerformance.worst) 
                cvPerformance.worst = performance; 
            end 
  
            if(performance < cvPerformance.best) 
               cvPerformance.best=performance; 
               network=net; 
               trainingRecord=tr; 
            end 
             
            if(performance > 3.363105e+000) 
                
                %tr.best_perf 
                %tr.best_vperf 
            end 
  
            cvPerformance.average = cvPerformance.average + performance; 
        end 
    end 
    cvPerformance.average = cvPerformance.average/10; 
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    display('Worst performance'); 
    cvPerformance.worst 
    display('Best performance'); 
    cvPerformance.best 
    display('Average performance'); 
    cvPerformance.average 
         
    testSize= length(testTarget);                            %testInput, testTarget 
    testTarget = testTarget'; 
    testInput = testInput'; 
     
    testTesultsFile = 'testTesultsFile.txt'; 
    fid = fopen(testTesultsFile,'w'); 
    fprintf(fid,'%s \t\t\t\t %s \t\t %s \r\n\r\n','Input', 'Target Output', 'Actual Output'); 
  
    correct=0; 
     
    for k=1:testSize 
        [testOutput]  = network(testInput(:, k)); 
         
        if(testTarget(1 , k) > testTarget(2 , k)) 
             
            if(testOutput(1 , 1) > testOutput(2 , 1)) 
                fprintf(fid,'%s \t|  ', sprintf('%d ',testInput(:, k)')); 
                fprintf(fid,'%s \t|  ', sprintf('%d  ',testTarget(:, k)')); 
                fprintf(fid,'%s | ',sprintf('%f  ',testOutput)); 
                fprintf(fid,' %s \r\n\r\n', 'Correct'); 
                correct=correct+1; 
            else 
                 
                fprintf(fid,'%s \t|  ', sprintf('%d ',testInput(:, k)')); 
                fprintf(fid,'%s \t|  ', sprintf('%d  ',testTarget(:, k)')); 
                fprintf(fid,'%s | ',sprintf('%f  ',testOutput)); 
                fprintf(fid,' %s \r\n\r\n', 'Not Correct'); 
                 
            end 
             
        elseif(testTarget(1 , k) < testTarget(2 , k)) 
             
            if(testOutput(1 , 1) < testOutput(2 , 1)) 
                fprintf(fid,'%s \t|  ', sprintf('%d ',testInput(:, k)')); 
                fprintf(fid,'%s \t|  ', sprintf('%d  ',testTarget(:, k)')); 
                fprintf(fid,'%s | ',sprintf('%f  ',testOutput)); 
                fprintf(fid,' %s \r\n\r\n', 'Correct'); 
                correct=correct+1; 
            else 
                 
                fprintf(fid,'%s \t|  ', sprintf('%d ',testInput(:, k)')); 
                fprintf(fid,'%s \t|  ', sprintf('%d  ',testTarget(:, k)')); 
                fprintf(fid,'%s | ',sprintf('%f  ',testOutput)); 
                fprintf(fid,' %s \r\n\r\n', 'Not Correct'); 
                 
            end 
        end 
    end 
    fclose(fid); 
    TestResults = (correct/testSize)*100; 
     
    display(TestResults); 
     
     
    plotperform(trainingRecord); 
     
end 
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function [ cvMatrix ] = getCrossValidationMatrix( target ) 
%UNTITLED9 Summary of this function goes here 
%   Detailed explanation goes here 
  
targetValues= unique(target,'rows'); 
if(length(targetValues) > 2 & length(targetValues) < 2) 
    display('This function accepts only matricex with two target classes.') 
    cvMatrix = zeros(1,1); 
else 
    
    classOneIndx=find(ismember(target, targetValues(1,:), 'rows')); 
    classTwoIndx=find(ismember(target, targetValues(2,:), 'rows')); 
     
    numOfclassOnes = length(classOneIndx); 
    numOfclassTwos = length(classTwoIndx); 
     
    cvClassOnes = numOfclassOnes * 0.1; 
    cvClassTwos = numOfclassTwos * 0.1; 
     
    cvMatrix = zeros(10,ceil(cvClassOnes+cvClassTwos)); 
     
    for cvFold=1:10 
        counter=0; 
        %f: first class 
        for f=cvFold:10:numOfclassOnes 
            counter=counter+1; 
            cvMatrix(cvFold,counter)=classOneIndx(f); 
        end 
  
        %s: second class 
        for s=cvFold:10:numOfclassTwos 
            counter=counter+1; 
            cvMatrix(cvFold,counter)=classTwoIndx(s); 
        end 
         







function [ testInd ] = getTestIndex( target ) 
%UNTITLED9 Summary of this function goes here 
%   Detailed explanation goes here 
  
targetValues= unique(target,'rows'); 
if(length(targetValues) > 2 & length(targetValues) < 2) 
    display('This function accepts only matricex with two target 
classes.') 
    testInd = zeros(1,1); 
else 
    
    classOneIndx=find(ismember(target, targetValues(1,:), 'rows')); 
    classTwoIndx=find(ismember(target, targetValues(2,:), 'rows')); 
     
    numOfclassOnes = length(classOneIndx); 
    numOfclassTwos = length(classTwoIndx); 
     
    cvClassOnes = numOfclassOnes * 0.05; 
    cvClassTwos = numOfclassTwos * 0.05; 
     
    testInd = zeros(1,ceil(cvClassOnes+cvClassTwos)); 
     
    counter=0; 
    %f: first class 
    for f=1:10:numOfclassOnes 
        counter=counter+1; 
        testInd(1,counter)=classOneIndx(f); 
    end 
  
    %s: second class 
    for s=1:10:numOfclassTwos 
        counter=counter+1; 
        testInd(1,counter)=classTwoIndx(s); 
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This paper presents a multi-factor authentication approach that extends traditional username-password au-
thentication with hardware and user behaviour profiling techniques. The aim of the approach is to improve the
reliability of authentication by computing trust and confidence scores against user profiles. Based on the level of
trust, the access control mechanisms may then choose to (un-)lock certain functions or even classify the access as
an attack and redirect the user to a honey-pot to gather additional information about the attacker that can be
used for a trace-back. The novelty of the approach is that it observes the correlation between users’ behaviours
and their hardware usage as implicit verification procedures to discriminate the usage of the user-name and
password entry.
Keywords: Authentication, Profiling, Multi Factor Authentication, Keystroke Recognition.
1 Introduction
In this paper, we present a simple password mechanism that is augmented with additional profiling techniques to
create a form of multi-factor authentication. Using password keys in authentication alone is not reliable due to
the users inability to keep them confidential; in addition passwords are often prone to dictionary or rainbow-table
attacks as well as the ease with which social engineering techniques can obtain passwords. To address some of these
issues our approach integrates with the traditional password authentication by using Hardware Manufacture Serial
Part Numbers (HMSPNs) to consider the user environment. This approach can be easily integrated in existing
password based authentication schemes. Additional factors that are considered in the authentication process are
the users’ behaviour in providing the user-name and password and the user-profile in using a variety of hardware.
Both factors do not require the user to memorise or otherwise keep additional secret information.
Three widely accepted authentication principles base the identification of a user on a) something the user has,
b) something the user knows or c) something the user is or does. Multi-factor Authentication Mechanisms employ
various techniques, often drawing on several of the above principles to establish a user’s identity. For example
the credit card payment system (Kumar et al. 2008) with biometric authentication proposes to employ fingerprint
verification with a credit card in a multi factor authentication scheme, combining principles a) the card and c) the
fingerprint.
However, such an approach would require the installation of additional equipment, thus increasing the cost.
The use of additional devices such as fingerprint readers typically also adds to the time taken for authentication
which affects the user acceptability for the system. Given that fingerprints can be spoofed with relative ease
(Ihmaidi et al. 2006) the overall gain in security is questionable. Indeed most current approaches to multi-factor
authentication (Naji et al. 2011, Trevathan et al. 2009) are typically expensive and difficult to deploy and directly
affect the usability of the system, as they prolong the authentication process.
The approach presented in this paper avoids the impact of the additional authentication procedures on usability
and does not require extra devices to be deployed to end-users. The key novelty of the presented approach is that it
integrates profiling information with established user-name/password authentication and can be used to discriminate
valid use of password credentials against misuse by an attacker, without complicating the authentication process or
incurring large extra costs.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews related work of authentication techniques, HMSPNs usage
in access control and tracking approaches. Section 3 illustrates our authentication approach and the main system
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activity. Next, the paper provides a sample analysis scenario using our approach to profile hardware and user
activity. After that, the paper provides our system architecture and implements a prototype to show a case study.
Finally, the paper evaluates the initial results of our technique and presents the conclusion of the paper including
achievements and future work.
2 Related Work
Naji et al. (2011) enhance the security of an access control system using handwritten signature. Their system
employs the static and dynamic features of the signature to make a decision about the identity of the signature
through a combination of matching statistical models to analyse them. Handwritten signature processing and
extracting their features is time consuming and requires dedicated hardware at the user-end.
Card readers are an additional level of hardware security is using one-time password (OTP). The chip on
the client “user” card generates the OTP, with the caveat that the account is rendered inaccessible if the card
is lost or stolen. This additional challenge-response mechanism over a separate channel removes the need for
security questions to confirm transactions and helps preventing fraud. However, this mechanisms requires additional
accessories and increases deployment cost (Ravi et al. 2004). With the ubiquity of mobile phones, sending SMS text
or voice messages that include one-time password (OTP) is in effect extending the card-reader approach. Here the
mobile phone is considered a secure channel, albeit with the increasing connectivity of smart-phones this cannot be
considered as independent as the original card-reader. Whilst this approach reduces the cost in deploying readers it
adds additional costs on the extra communication channel and requires these channels to be accessible to the user
(Zomai & Jsang 2010).
Hardware has been used to facilitate authentication for a long time. The idea is that users register devices
(e.g. based on their MAC address) so that the devices are authenticated rather than their users. Examples of
devices are storage media drivers such as hard disc drives HDDs. Each storage media has a unique HMSPN as
an identifier product that can be used in profiling (Patowary 2009). This HMSPNs are already actively used for
identification, albeit they can be modified at a firm-ware level and thus are susceptible to spoofing, e.g. Microsoft
products send product and hardware identifiers during the activation process (Microsoft Corporation 2010). These
hardware information provide the opportunity to profile the users’ computing environment.
Based on the hypothesis that different people type in uniquely different typing measure. There are many basic
methods (Shanmugapriya & Padmavathi 2009, Attila M 2007, Bergadano et al. 2002, Clarke & Furnell 2007, Yu &
Cho 2004, Lee & Cho 2007) used to analyse keystroke typing.
Keystroke dynamics can be used as behavioural biometrics for users. It is an analysing technique for users typing
behaviour when keyboard input is monitored (Obaidat & Sadoun 1999). However, if keystroke is not combined
with particular keystrokes keys such as the password, it is insufficient to be an objective authentication factor (Teh
et al. 2010). The keystroke approach is mostly characterised by the error rates in these following precision cases
based on False Acceptance Rates (FAR), False Rejection Rates (FRR) and Equal Error Rates (EER)(Monrose &
Rubin 2000).
Statistical (Bergadano et al. 2002) and neural network (Gunetti & Picardi 2005) techniques are the main
two analysing keystroke approaches. Additionally, there are some combinations of both approaches (Monrose
et al. 1999, Clarke & Furnell 2007). Statistical approaches compare a reference set of typing characteristic of
specific user with test set of typing characteristic of the same user. Neural Networks use historical data that come
from first usage, and then uses this data model to expect the result of new test or classify a new observation (Yu
& Cho 2004, Lee & Cho 2007).
Some drawbacks have been exposed by other research (Lv & Wang 2006) that inhibits keystroke from real word
applications. One research experiment provided the possibility of using modified keyboards that were based on
a pressure sensor to recognize users keystroke (Lv & Wang 2006). This method requires specific keyboards that
thus adding again additional cost to the user. To reduce the environment factor that may affect user behaviour in
keystroke, Maxion & Killourhy (2010) explored a number pad input using a single finger. They tried to discriminate
users typing style, FAR and FRR scope suggests a low level of surety that authentication using keystroke biometrics
might be possible in this particular environment.
3 Our Approach
Our approach combines hardware identification with key-stroke biometrics, yielding a multi-factor authentication
approach in which user biometrics can be correlated with the hard-ware that is used during the login process.
The analysis of user-typing patterns on particular hardware by monitoring the keyboard inputs can visualize the
significant pattern difference between the users. This correlation is reducing the FAR and FRR rates and allows the
approach to be deployed throughout heterogeneous systems which are comprised of various hardware interfaces.
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The key contribution of our approach is to improve the login-procedure by determining the level of trust of the
user without additional cost or making the deployment of the solution overly complex. Thus, the key objective of
our approach is developing a novel technique for the analysis of HMSPNs properties and patterns that are captured
in the computational model. After that, an approach is developed for modelling the dynamic behaviour of the user.
Then, user profiles based on analyzing and modelling users’ behaviour to develop a new technique for the analysis
of Internet services based on these profiles is formulated.
Hardware parts have a particular history in HMSPNs usage. Some computer hardware parts have not changed
and have been used by the manufacturer for a long time. Therefore, every computer device has a history tracking
over the time of its Life cycle. Thus, each computer hardware part has a particular track of usage from manufacture
phase to destruction. First, if a user has been dealing with a device for every log in procedure for access control
applications for a long time, this user will be more familiar with this hardware and has a particular behaviour when
using it. Therefore, the user has a particular pattern scope that will be used with this hardware. Consequently, if the
number of users of a particular hardware is increased, our authentication approach has to recognize the way these
users behave when using this hardware, even if they use the same user-name and password. Of course, the sharing of
accounts is bad practice, but still commonly encountered in both domestic and corporate environments over which
the service provider has little influence. For example in Figure 1 Bob and Colin used John’s hardware, however
they have different behaviours in dealing with same hardware. Consequently, our approach has to find the different
attribution of users’ behaviour when they use the same hardware and the same user-name and password. Ultimately,
our authentication technique maps user environment hardware in order to demonstrate the user behaviour in
previous pattern usage in particular hardware.
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Figure 1: Hardware and users behaviour Life Cycle
The hardware life cycle in Figure 1 explains conceptually the hardware usage that supports the learning of user
behaviour depending on a particular hardware configuration. However, the hardware parts may change over the
time, resulting at configurations that are distinct to previous login attempts by their users. One example is the use
of a tablet. E.g. the login may be typed on the touch screen or (after attaching the tablet to a docking station)
through a physical keyboard. These changes in hardware configurations affect user profiling. “Step 1” and “Step
2” in Figure 1 reflect changing the hardware parts which change user environment. Therefore, the system has to
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Figure 2: System Overview
3.1 System Overview
Our authentication system uses two components in the login procedure. Whilst the user u is typing his/her user-
name and password, our first component captures the current user behaviour (bu) by calculating the keystroke (both
key-press and release) speed when username and password are typed. The second component collects the HMSPNs,
which make up the user’s current hardware configuration (cu). As the user or other security software installed on
the client machine can prevent the gathering of hardware information, we consider this to be optional information.
However, if this information is not provided it has detrimental effects on the accuracy of our mechanism, as the
hardware profiling information is coupled with the selection of the user-profile for keystroke recognition. If the
user provides access to the hardware profile, the system begins to analyse and compare the current hardware
configuration (cu) with the established profile of that user (c̄u) to determine their similarity. If the user has used
the current hardware before, the system computes the similarity between the current keystroke behaviour of the
user (bu) and the behaviour that has been recorded against this hard-ware configuration previously (b̄u,cu). If the
current hardware configuration is not known, the component will try to match bu against all known keystroke
behaviours for that user b̄u,∗ indiscriminate of the hardware configuration, which obviously reduces the effectiveness
of this mechanism.
Given that the username and password checks are successfully passed, the system will compute out of the
similarity between the hardware configuration and their profiles, and the associated keystroke behaviour similarity
to their profiles two levels of trust. If only keystroke information is available, only one level of trust is being used
in the following.
Given that usernames and passwords are not very secure, the hardware similarity test reflects the idea that
hardware that has been previously used by the same user increases the likelihood of the user being genuine, as this
rules out attacks in which passwords have been observed by shoulder surfing or rainbow table attacks. In addition,
uncharacteristic use of hardware, e.g. the use of a company PC that has regularly been used during office-hours for
6 month and from which now an access is taking place at 2am in the night, is flagged up by a low trust-level in the
hardware.
Similarly the key-stroke behaviour is evaluated, linked against the used hardware configuration (cu) if available.
The system will authenticate normally if the username and password are correct and a threshold in both levels
of trust is passed. If the user-name and password do not match, the authentication is considered failed. If the




Figure 3: Hardware history
behaviour the system can be configured to adapt to the level of trust. E.g. the authentication can be failed; the user
can be authenticated with reduced privileges such as only being able to view his account details; the system can
increase the threshold for an intrusion detection system that identifies fraudulent activity based on the transactions
that are undertaken or even redirect the user to a honey pot trapping system to explore if the user is a hacker using
a spoofed user-name and password. In an e-banking context, this could e.g. mean to delay the transactions and
attempt to contact the user via a different channel such as email or phone. Figure 2 shows the basic steps in the
system operation.
3.2 System Activities
Our technique depends on the matching of the current hardware configuration cu against the users previous hardware
behaviour c̄u and the associated user behaviour bu against the previous user behaviour b̄u as part of the login
procedure.
On the client side, the login prompt performs three data-collection functions. Firstly the username and password
is collected in the traditional way. Secondly the keystroke behaviour of the user is gathered during the typing of the
username and password. Functions like autocompletion and provision for copy & paste are turn off, as they would
effectively disable the recognition of the keystroke behaviour. Thirdly the login prompt will attempt to collect the
hardware configuration from the user’s operating system. This may require the user to whitelist the login software
or the server address from which the login prompt is loaded.
On the server side the authentication module will first check the username and password hash against the stored
credentials. If this is successful, the additional two components hardware recogniser and keystroke recogniser are
invoked to further qualify the login request, thus providing additional scrutiny.
3.2.1 Hardware Recogniser
The hardware trust is computed by the hardware recogniser, which matches the current configuration against
previously used hardware configurations for the same user based on the parts’ serial numbers. This process takes
into account the previous usage patterns of the user over time and also considers other aspects such as concurrent
usage of the same hardware configuration or hardware parts in different login processes, which e.g. could indicate
a spoofing attack. Essentially there are three key results that can are generated by this component:
1. Trust level based on usage of hardware configuration
2. Known configuration for use in behaviour recognition (or matching configuration)
3. Cross login analysis for attack detection.
The trust level is computed against the history of previous login-attempts and their associated hardware con-
figurations c̄u which is essentially drawn from the sequence of previous successful login attempts by this user.
Figure 3 shows a simplified example. Every node on the timeline represents a successful login by the user in
question. The used hardware configuration is depicted by the shape of the node, eg. the empty circle could be the
user’s office machine, the square a mobile device, the filled circle a user’s home computer. The first step is that
the hardware is checked whether it has been used before, ie. it is known to the system, which is important for the
keystroke recogniser in subsequent checks. This establishes a baseline trust for the access in case the hardware is
known.
Secondly the access is viewed in the context of the other accesses (left neighbours), the time and the day of
the access. We chose metrics based on time of day and day in week as these constitute the majority of repetitions
we have encountered. We currently do not support more complex analysis of these events in our prototype, but
envision the use of neural networks or support vector machines to establish a behaviour baseline against which
the check can be performed. Based on the “fit” of the hardware configuration used in the login the trust level is
adjusted.
Thirdly, the hardware recogniser maintains a cache of recent and current login activities over the entire user-base.
If there is a current login from the same hardware configuration or configurations that share particular hardware
components there is a chance that one of the logins is fraudulent and based on spoofed hardware information. It
is known that some hardware manufacturers fail to provide unique serial numbers for their components. For the
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u s e r p a ss
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Figure 4: Keystroke patterns
Table 1: Keystroke profile b̄ucu against hardware configuration cu
# 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
u↓ 10 8 9 11 15 8 10 8 11 6 12
u↑ 10 8 9 11 15 8 10 8 11 6 12
s↓ 6 5 7 8 9 6 7 6 8 5 8
s↑ 15 10 10 12 20 12 11 10 12 12 10
known cases we have a black-list of manufacturer ids which are excluded from this analysis step. A collision here
reduces the trust level established by the hardware recogniser.
3.2.2 Keystroke Recogniser
The keystroke recogniser takes the current keystroke pattern entered by the user (bu) and matches it against the
previous recorded keystroke behaviour of that user using that hardware (b̄u,cu).
The keystroke pattern is characterised by the press and release times of the keys that are used in entering the
username and password and is gathered on the client side. Figure 4 gives an example of such a pattern.
Our current prototype only considers the press and release times as a proof of concept and does not use other
correlations between subsequent keypress events that may be further improving the accuracy. As the contribution of
this paper is not a novel keystroke recognition scheme, but the integration of multiple approaches this mechanism can
be replaced with more sophisticated techniques such as specific keystroke recognition(Shanmugapriya & Padmavathi
2009).
We currently build a trust-metrics based on whether the current keystroke pattern fits the users profile infor-
mation, where the profile is created based on the previous user inputs. For example with respect to Figure 4 the
first keyevent is the time the letter “u” is pressed. Previous logins e.g. recorded the times in Table 1 which forms
the user profile, depicted in Figure 5. Currently the system looks at the variance of the data and the percentile into
which the current keystroke pattern falls with respect to each of the keypress and release events and computes an
accumulated trust level over all events contained in the keystroke pattern. In comparison to e.g. specific keystroke
recognition (Obaidat & Sadoun 1999) this is a very simple approach which we plan to refine in the future.
3.3 System analysis
Our technique depends on the matching of the current hardware configuration cu against the users previous hardware
behaviour c̄u and the associated user behaviour bu against the previous user behaviour b̄u as part of the login


























Figure 5: Keystroke Profile
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password is collected in the traditional way. Secondly the keystroke behaviour of the user is gathered during the
typing of the user-name and password. Functions like autocompletion and provision for copy & paste are turn off,
as they would effectively disable the recognition of the keystroke behaviour. Thirdly the login prompt will attempt
to collect the hardware configuration from the user’s operating system. This may require the user to whitelist the
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Figure 6: Flow chart
4 Case-Study
We developed a simple Java application to apply our approach in the login process as an implicit login procedure.
Every log in, our system captures user behaviour using a keystroke function to calculate users typing speed and
response time among the keys of the user-name and password. The user-name and password contains characters
and number. Then, when the user typed his/her valid user-name and password the system collects three parts of
HMSPNs. These parts are the BIOS device number, MAC address number and the hard disk drive number. After
that, the system recognizes if the user used current hardware before and if and to what extend the hardware was
used by other users. Figure 7 shows the percentage of hardware usage and user pattern stamp by determining how
the current user behaviour is related to previous usage patterns.
In this case study, system improves the ability of observe the levels of trust to reflect the different bu when
the user uses different hardware. In this scenario, the user performed 200 succeeded log in using username and
password as key to log. However, the user used two devices representing two different hardware environments.
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Figure 7: HMSPNs usage cu and profile b̄u,cu against keystroke pattern bu.
Figure 8: LEFT: HMSPNs usage cu and profile b̄u,cu against one user uses two hardware. RIGHT: HMSPNs usage
cu and profile b̄u,cu against two users use same login information (password) in one hardware
In the second scenario, two users used same hardware and a shared password for 100 successful log in attempts.
The system recognised the effect of the hardware in user keystroke behaviour. In addition, the system compared
between the users depending on their familiarity with the hardware. This recognition comes from the hardware
trust.
4.1 Trust
For all login attempts that provided the correct username and hardware we computed the hardware trust based
on the hardware configuration that was used in the login attempt against the previously encountered hardware.
We computed the trust-level based on precedences, ie. if the hardware was encountered previously we assigned a
baseline trust of 40% for previously encountered hardware. Based on whether there was a precedent of that hardware
being used on that day in the week, within that hour of the day and after the use of the previously used hardware
configuration, we added additional 20% as these occurrences increased our confidence. If the hardware configuration
(or part thereof) was used concurrently in another login process we substracted 60% from the trust-level.
For all three hardware configurations that were used in the case-study, we recorded 100 keystroke patterns to
build up the profile. The trust was computed by calculating the deviation from the mean for each key-event (key-
press and release) of the profile against the standard deviation as a percentage value. The overall keystroke trust
was then computed as the mean of the individual percentage values.
We overall set relatively low thresholds for both trust levels, and proceeded with the authentication when both
trust levels exceeded 70%. If only one of the trust-levels exceeded the threshold, an additional verification question
was asked from the user. If this was answered correctly the authentication was considered successful. If both trust
levels fell below the threshold, the login attempt was considered unsuccessful and the user was returned to the login
prompt. We considered a maximum of three unsuccessful login attempts before the account was blocked.
The recorded profile information was only updated after a successful login attempt. This means that even if
behaviour or hardware usage changed over time the system was able to adapt, in most cases via the provision of an




5 Conclusion & Future Work
The availability of hardware information can enhance authentication mechanisms. The work presented in this
paper shows that by capturing a wide range of statistics it is possible to perform an analysis of hardware and user
behaviour. In this paper we considered keystroke as a biometrics. By combining password based authentication
with hardware profiling and keystroke recognition we provided a multi-factor authentication scheme that does not
require additional devices to be deployed and adds little cost to the deployment of the authentication system.
The paper reviewed related work on authentication approaches and their limitation as a motivation for this
approach. We then presented our approach and showed how the additional data can be collected on the client
side and what data needs to be collected. We then described in detail the server-side and the functioning of the
hardware-recogniser and the keystroke recogniser and how their interaction improves the accuracy of keystroke
recognition as a more specific profile can be maintained depending on the hardware that is used.
We implemented our prototype system using basic profiling techniques for the analysis and presented a trust-
model that takes into account the hardware usage and the user behaviour when entering his/her username and
password. The prototype is of course a proof of concept that shows that the techniques can be combined and
that their combination yields a positive influence on the accuracy of the detection. In the future we will refine
the individual techniques and adopt e.g. keystroke recognition approaches that have been presented in (Obaidat &
Sadoun 1999). We provided a java-based prototype implementation of our authentication system and presented a
small case-study as a proof of concept for our work.
In the future we will refine the profiling techniques used in our authentication framework and are looking at
implementing techniques based on neural networks or support vector machines. We also investigate the use of the
profile information in attack attribution, as the hardware profiles can provide indication about (fraudulent) users.
In addition, we will look at geo-spatial information and its integration in the hardware recogniser. The idea is that
successive logins from different geographical areas are not plausible and can indicate fraudulent activity. In this
line of investigation we will also actively deploy honeypots to further identify behavioural traits of the user. This
information can then be used twofolds: a) to provide additional attribution information about the attacker; b) to
retrospectively authorise the actions performed if the user is deemed to be genuine.
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